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INTRODUCTION 
Certain constitutional rights are intricately bound up with, and in some 
cases critically dependent upon, access to and enjoyment of public proper-
ties.  This is true in a variety of constitutional contexts.  For example, one 
of the distinct lessons of the civil rights era was that constitutional equality 
 
*  Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.  I would like to thank Nelson Tebbe for his help-
ful comments on an earlier draft.  I would also like to thank my colleague, William Van Alstyne, for 
sparking my interest in this topic and for sharing his insights concerning this and countless other consti-
tutional law subjects. 
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entails equal access to public properties and facilities.1  Similarly, First 
Amendment anti-establishment principles require that officials operate and 
maintain public places in a manner that is not perceived as endorsing, 
through symbolic displays or otherwise, particular religious sects or sectari-
anism.2  Anti-endorsement and antisectarianism ensure equality of enjoy-
ment with respect to parks and other public properties.  The First 
Amendment’s free speech and free assembly guarantees also require that 
access to at least some public properties be provided.3   
Of course, the mere fact that public properties may facilitate constitu-
tional liberties does not mean that officials have an obligation to make them 
available or own them in perpetuity.4  Governments possess the organic 
power to dispose of public assets.  The Constitution does not generally con-
strain the choices private property owners might make in terms of equal ac-
cess, religious displays, and expressive activity.  Suppose, then, that the 
government sells or otherwise conveys public property to a private owner or 
simply closes a public facility such as a public park.  Suppose further that, 
after these dispositions, some members of the community remain deeply of-
fended by a religious display that remains on the subject property or that 
speakers continue to claim a right of access to what once was a traditional 
public forum.  Has disposition of the subject property necessarily settled or 
extinguished their constitutional claims?   
This question, which has recurred in various contexts since at least the 
civil rights era, has never been systematically analyzed or definitively an-
swered.5  Consider the following dispositions, or attempted dispositions, of 
public property: 
 
1  DAVID DELANEY, RACE, PLACE, AND THE LAW 1836–1948 (1998) (highlighting the importance of 
physical and experiential geography in the history of racial conflict by discussing the connections be-
tween space, power, experience, and the law leading up to and during the civil rights era).  
2  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612–21 (1989) (applying “endorsement” 
test to religious displays on public property). 
3  For a general discussion of the importance of public places to speech and assembly rights, see 
TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 
(2009).  For an analysis of the intersection of property rights and free speech in cases decided by the 
Burger Court, see Norman Dorsen & Joel Gora, Free Speech, Property, and the Burger Court: Old Val-
ues, New Balances, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 195. 
4  See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1422–24 (1989) 
(noting the discretionary nature of most government benefits). 
5  Governments have always disposed of properties under broad grants of federal, state, and local 
power.  See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (“Like any other owner 
[Congress] may provide when, how and to whom its land can be sold.”).  The extent to which these dis-
position powers are limited by constitutional rights was a question that frequently arose during the civil 
rights era.  See infra Part I.   
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• Faced in the 1960s with the prospect of imminent, court-ordered de-
segregation of all of its municipal pools, a city council votes to close 
all public pool facilities.6  
• A Latin cross is located on a small patch of federal parkland in the 
California desert.  In response to a federal appeals court decision 
holding that the display violates the Establishment Clause, Congress 
conveys the property to a private landowner but retains a reversion-
ary interest and an access easement with respect to the subject prop-
erty.7 
• To end a decades-long local controversy concerning a Latin cross 
displayed on public property, Congress takes the parcel by eminent 
domain.8     
• A city sells a portion of Main Street to a private owner but retains an 
easement on the property for pedestrian use.  After a court invali-
dates certain expressive limits imposed on speakers using the ease-
ment, the city sells its remaining present interest in the property to a 
religious organization but retains a reversionary interest.9    
• In response to traffic and other public order problems stemming from 
abortion protesters’ activity in a public cul-de-sac in front of an abor-
tion clinic, city officials vacate a public pedestrian and parking 
easement with respect to the cul-de-sac.10   
In these and other circumstances, seemingly ordinary property disposi-
tions—i.e., sales, leases, easements, assignments, dedications, vacations, 
transfers, reversionary interests—have played a critical role in adjudicating 
and purportedly settling constitutional claims.  As the examples above 
show, public officials have disposed of public properties to avoid constitu-
tional litigation and, in some cases, to circumvent injunctive decrees.  Prop-
erty dispositions have also been used as a means of quelling public 
controversy, freeing public officials and private owners from constitutional 
fetters, and suppressing controversial speech.   
As the first example indicates, the practice of what this Article calls 
“settlement-by-disposition” has deep and varied roots tracing at least to the 
civil rights era.  Settlement-by-disposition has taken two principal forms.  
 
6  See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 218–19, 226 (1971) (holding that the city’s closing of all 
public pools did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
7  See Salazar v. Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1816 (2010) (holding that the district court erred 
when it failed to address whether a land transfer statute violated the Establishment Clause).   
8 See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (holding that a fed-
eral taking of a memorial site resulting in the presence of a cross on federal property did not violate the 
Establishment Clause).   
9  See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 2005) (uphold-
ing the city’s eventual divestment).  
10  See Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195, 1202–03 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (invalidating the gov-
ernment’s vacation as impermissible destruction of a traditional public forum). 
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Some property dispositions are responses to pending or imminent legal 
claims or judicial mandates.  The disposition serves as a purported settle-
ment of the claims or court orders.  Other dispositions may take place in the 
absence of any pending or threatened legal action.  However, when an ac-
cess claim is brought, the government cites the property disposition as a 
trump or settlement of any constitutional claims.  In both instances, the dis-
position is claimed to have extinguished any constitutional claims or obliga-
tions.  Settlements most often take the form of privatization of properties 
and facilities, but as we shall see they can also result from public ownership 
of formerly private property.    
Although equality doctrine, antidiscrimination laws, and social norms 
have essentially negated the use of property dispositions to effectuate racial 
and other forms of segregation, property settlement has become increas-
ingly common—and increasingly controversial—in some contemporary 
First Amendment contexts.11  In several cases, officials faced with injunc-
tions forbidding religious displays on public properties have sold or other-
wise conveyed the parcel in question rather than remove the sectarian 
symbols.12  Other means of property allocation, including federal takings of 
local properties, have also been used to purportedly settle speech and estab-
lishment controversies.13  In public speech and assembly contexts, officials 
have privatized and otherwise disposed of traditional public forum proper-
ties, including public sidewalks and streets.  After these dispositions, gov-
ernments and the new private owners have claimed that any First 
Amendment difficulties have been settled or avoided.14 
The practice of settlement-by-disposition raises fundamental constitu-
tional questions.  The dispositions examined in this Article represent far 
more than mere sales, land swaps, or routine takings.  They raise critical 
questions about the nature of governmental power and responsibility, and 
about the character of constitutional liberties.  If officials can settle or ex-
tinguish constitutional claims through property dispositions, does this mean 
that constitutional liberties that are intimately connected to public properties 
are in an important sense merely discretionary?  Does it mean, to quote a 
recent Supreme Court decision involving the government’s power over fed-
eral territories, that officials may use their authority to “acquire, dispose of, 
 
11  There are other contexts in which private law regimes also have been used to settle or address 
constitutional obligations.  See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe, Privatizing and Publicizing Speech, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 70, 80–82 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/30/ 
LRColl2009n30Tebbe.pdf (questioning the propriety of using various private law property and contract 
rules to manage or avoid constitutional constraints).  
12  See, e.g., Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1813; see also infra Part II.  
13  See, e.g., Trunk, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 1202; see also Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions 
Targeting First Amendment Land Uses, 69 MO. L. REV. 653, 655–62 (2004) (discussing the use of emi-
nent domain in the context of adult establishments).  
14  See infra Part III. 
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and govern [public property]” in order to essentially “switch the Constitu-
tion on or off at will”?15 
As noted, governments obviously have the power to sell or otherwise 
convey public properties.16  Once they do so, it would seem that constitu-
tional restrictions no longer apply to either the subject properties or their 
new owners or possessors.17  As we shall see, however, the reality is much 
more complicated.  Since the civil rights era, courts have struggled to define 
the limits of settlement-by-disposition.  In many cases, courts have focused 
primarily upon compliance with private property law principles to assess 
the constitutionality of dispositions.  Absent the most unusual circum-
stances, bona fide sales and other dispositions have been treated as legiti-
mate resolutions of constitutional disputes relating to a public property.  
Owing to the fact that the properties under consideration are public, how-
ever, many courts have not been comfortable relying solely on private prop-
erty rules.  Thus, at least some courts have acknowledged that formalistic 
review of public property dispositions does not adequately protect against 
the circumvention or evasion of public obligations and constitutional guar-
antees.  Assessment of settlement-by-disposition has not proven susceptible 
to easy answers or bright-line rules.  Indeed neither courts nor commenta-
tors have offered any coherent framework for considering the legitimacy of 
disposition as a means of constitutional settlement.   
To better understand and articulate the constitutional boundaries of set-
tlement-by-disposition, this Article examines the practice in three constitu-
tional contexts: equality, establishment, and speech.  Part I examines the 
devises, leases, sales, and closures that formed an important part of the 
massive resistance to desegregation from the 1950s to the early 1970s.  
During the civil rights era, local and state officials frequently sought to en-
gage in “circumvention-by-disposition” by using the mechanisms of private 
property law to avoid equality obligations.  Some courts thwarted these ef-
forts by rejecting formalism, stretching state action principles, and assessing 
official motives and purposes.  But, wary of the implications of a broad 
scale rejection of settlement-by-disposition, which included forcing locali-
ties or states to maintain public properties and facilities in perpetuity, other 
courts, including the Supreme Court, upheld dispositions even though the 
effect was circumvention of the equality guarantee.  The civil rights era ex-
perience highlighted the fundamental tension between the government’s 
power to dispose of public properties and the constitutional liberties that 
depend upon access to those properties.  Although courts adopted an ap-
proach that focused on the bona fides of each disposition, they never devel-
 
15  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008). 
16  See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915). 
17  See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“It is, of course, a commonplace that the 
constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or 
state.”). 
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oped a coherent framework for assessing the constitutional and democratic 
legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition.  Court decisions during the civil 
rights era were understandably ad hoc and fact-specific; many were issued 
in response to circumvention tactics by local officials.  Owing in part to the 
fact that equality doctrine was still in its infancy, courts tended to focus nar-
rowly on the specific terms of a devise or sale rather than on officials’ pub-
lic obligations with regard to the subject properties.  Although they 
invalidated some dispositions and questioned others, the courts ultimately 
left the outer boundaries of settlement-by-disposition unsettled.  They did 
not, for example, rule on the constitutionality of closing the public schools 
entirely in response to integration orders.18     
As Part II shows, the fundamental tension between governmental own-
ership of certain properties and constitutional liberties has recently resur-
faced in Establishment Clause controversies.  Public officials increasingly 
have turned to property disposition as a means of settling Establishment 
Clause controversies.  As did their predecessors in the civil rights context, 
contemporary courts have attempted to distinguish between constitutionally 
legitimate property settlements and sham circumventions.  Courts generally 
have purported to reject title formalism and to analyze both the form and 
substance of dispositions.  In truth, however, courts have placed few limits 
on settlement-by-disposition.  Only the most extraordinary circumstances 
will rebut the operative presumption that property dispositions are valid 
constitutional settlements.  Moreover, as during the civil rights era, courts 
have focused primarily on the specifics of the bidding process and private 
property concerns, such as the retention of future interests, rather than on 
the public obligations officials owe with respect to the subject properties.  
In a few cases, officials have avoided establishment difficulties by taking or 
publicizing property rather than privatizing it.  Although such settlements 
might be viewed as more democratically legitimate given the public obliga-
tions that apply in the takings context, as we shall see, there may be reasons 
to question their legitimacy as well.  Like all other powers, eminent domain 
authority is limited by constitutional liberties.  In sum, recent establishment 
cases generally have been as ad hoc and private-law-focused as the civil 
rights era disposition cases were.  They have provided no overarching 
framework for considering the constitutional and democratic validity of set-
tlement-by-disposition. 
Part III examines settlement-by-disposition in the First Amendment 
speech and assembly context.  The Supreme Court has never decided a case 
involving the lease, sale, closure, or other disposition of a traditional public 
forum.  At the margins, the legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition in the 
speech and assembly context would seem to be relatively clear.  For exam-
ple, as in other contexts, mere leases of public forum properties will not 
automatically extinguish all constitutional claims.  Moreover, officials pre-
 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 129–31. 
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sumably cannot sell or otherwise dispose of public forum properties in a 
purposeful effort to suppress certain speakers or speech.  In other contexts, 
however, courts have not offered a consistent and coherent framework for 
assessing settlement-by-disposition.  Some members of the Court have in-
dicated that the First Amendment does not prohibit officials from selling, 
physically altering, or otherwise disposing of traditional public forum prop-
erties.19  In apparent reliance on that understanding, some lower courts have 
upheld dispositions so long as title formally passes to a private owner.  As 
in the equality and establishment contexts, however, other courts have 
adopted a functional approach under which even some formally privatized 
properties may remain subject to First Amendment speech and assembly 
limitations.  Courts using a functional approach, however, have not offered 
any convincing justification for requiring officials and private owners to 
consider First Amendment speech and assembly limitations despite the 
formal transfer of title and ownership.  Finally, as in the establishment con-
text, governments have purported to settle free speech claims by publicizing 
or adopting private property located in public fora.  The government speech 
doctrine has become a form of settlement-by-disposition that may reallocate 
space and speech rights in public fora.       
Part IV synthesizes the examination of settlement-by-disposition in the 
equality, establishment, and speech contexts.  In each context, the govern-
ment’s power to dispose of properties conflicts with constitutional liberties 
that are intricately intertwined with or affected by disposition of those prop-
erties.  History and a close examination of the cases demonstrate that a sim-
ple rule either permitting or forbidding this particular form of 
“workaround” or settlement in all cases is not viable.20  However, the ad hoc 
approach that has prevailed since the civil rights era has failed to provide a 
coherent framework for considering the constitutional and democratic le-
gitimacy of settlement-by-disposition.  Ultimately, the legitimacy of settle-
ment-by-disposition should not turn narrowly on the specific terms of 
conveyance, including possession of title, preservation of future interests, 
the scope of access easements, and other private property matters.  Gov-
ernments are not typical property owners.  The assets involved are not ordi-
nary properties subject mainly to private property law rules.  Rather, these 
properties are critical constitutional assets.  They are held subject to a pub-
lic trust that imposes constitutional and democratic limits on their disposi-
 
19  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699–700 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring) (noting that “in some sense” governments always retain the authority to sell or close a 
public forum). 
20  See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499, 1503–04 
(2009) (“Constitutional workarounds . . . occur only if the Constitution is in some sense at war with it-
self: One part of the text prohibits something, other parts of the text permit it, and the Constitution itself 
does not appear to give either part priority over the other.” (footnotes omitted)).  The proposed settle-
ments examined in this Article are not technically “workarounds” as Tushnet defines that term, but they 
do involve a similar tension between political pressures and constitutional commitments. 
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tion.21  Pursuant to this trust, public officials owe fiduciary duties of fair 
dealing, preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants.  It is 
these public obligations, rather than private law principles, that define the 
constitutional boundaries of settlement-by-disposition.  The trust obliga-
tions apply whether the disposition is accomplished through private prop-
erty mechanisms or through invocation of public means such as takings.  
Although courts ought to have the public trust duties in mind when review-
ing settlement-by-disposition and deciding whether to enforce certain du-
ties, the obligations apply whether or not courts are able or even asked to 
enforce them.  Ultimately, the public trust imposes upon public officials the 
obligation to enter settlements that are constitutional in the sense that they 
are based upon valid trust purposes, comply with judicial decrees, and re-
spect minority rights.    
I. EQUALITY AND CIRCUMVENTION-BY-DISPOSITION 
Racial segregation was a massive and all-encompassing spatial enter-
prise.22  By law and local custom, people of color were separated from 
whites across the municipal landscape.  Places of recreation and repose, in-
cluding public parks, were subject to de jure and de facto segregation.23  
From the 1950s to the 1970s, equal access to public properties and facilities 
was a central claim of civil rights advocates.  Persons of color who could 
not enjoy public schools, parks, swimming pools, and golf courses on an 
equal basis with whites did not enjoy equal protection under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Premised on the fundamental right to equality, 
Brown v. Board of Education24 was the first in a line of cases that started 
with the desegregation of public schools but led to the extension of Brown’s 
desegregation mandate to other public properties, including parks and 
swimming pools.25  As discussed in this Part, rather than integrate these fa-
cilities, local and state officials frequently sought to extinguish equality 
claims by selling, closing, or otherwise disposing of them.  The judiciary 
 
21  See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (observing that traditional 
public fora are held in trust by government for the benefit of the people).   
22  See DELANEY, supra note 1, at 96 (describing public and private racial segregation as “a process 
of fanatical hyperterritoriality”). 
23  A 1957 Montgomery, Alabama ordinance was typical.  The ordinance made it a misdemeanor, 
subject to fine and imprisonment, “for white and colored persons to enter upon, visit, use or in any way 
occupy public parks or other public houses or public places, swimming pools, wadding [sic] pools, 
beaches, lakes or ponds except those assigned to their respective races.”  MONTGOMERY, ALA., CODE 
§ 21-57 (1957), quoted in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 558–59 (1974) (alteration in 
original). 
24  347 U.S. 483 (1954).  The Court held that denial of access to critically important public school 
facilities stigmatized students of color.  See id. at 494. 
25  See, e.g., Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 539 (1963) (enforcing injunction requiring 
desegregation of public recreational facilities); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386, 387 (4th 
Cir. 1955) (ordering desegregation of public beaches and bathhouses), aff’d, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). 
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was thus squarely confronted with a conflict between local power to dispose 
of public properties and civil liberties.  The civil rights era was obviously a 
unique period, and we ought not to extrapolate too broadly from the courts’ 
experience with settlement-by-disposition during this era.  However, impor-
tant lessons regarding the nature of constitutional liberties and the lawful 
boundaries of settlement-by-disposition can be drawn from the courts’ first 
sustained analysis of this practice.     
A. Devise and Divestment—The Baconsfield Saga 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutional limits of settle-
ment-by-disposition in a pair of cases involving a devise under the will of 
U.S. Senator Augustus O. Bacon.26  Since they represent the Court’s first 
thorough consideration of settlement-by-disposition and establish the basic 
contours of the debate, these cases are worth considering in some detail.   
Senator Bacon had devised a tract of land in Macon, Georgia (Bacons-
field) to the City of Macon and its mayor.27  According to the devise, the 
land was to be used as “a park and pleasure ground” for white people only.28  
If the city ever determined that it could not maintain Baconsfield as a seg-
regated park, the property was to revert to Senator Bacon’s heirs.29  Bacons-
field was to be maintained under the control of a seven-member board of 
managers, each of whom was required to be white.30  Macon officials main-
tained the park as a segregated facility for many years, but, in time, blacks 
were permitted to use the park.31  Members of the board filed suit, asking 
that the city be removed as trustee.32  Over the constitutional objections of 
several black individuals, the city resigned as trustee, seemingly divesting 
itself of any involvement with the property.33  In order to prevent failure of 
the trust, a Georgia court appointed three private individuals as new trus-
tees.34  The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the appointment.35  
In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Supreme Court held in Evans v. 
Newton that the city’s resignation as trustee and the subsequent appoint-
ment of private trustees did not settle the Fourteenth Amendment claims.36  
Given the city’s longstanding maintenance of the park and the tax exemp-
tion granted to it, the Court stated that the “momentum it acquired as a pub-
 
26  See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966). 
27  Newton, 382 U.S. at 297. 
28  Id.  
29  Abney, 396 U.S. at 436. 
30  Newton, 382 U.S. at 297. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. at 297–98. 
33  Id. at 298. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. at 302. 
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lic facility is certainly not dissipated ipso facto by the appointment of ‘pri-
vate’ trustees.”37  City officials, said the Court, continued to be “entwined” 
in the management, maintenance, and control of the park.38  Thus, the mere 
substitution of private trustees had not rendered the park a private facility.39  
The Court went on to note that under the developing state action doctrine, 
operating and maintaining a park of this character could be considered a 
“public function,” thus subjecting the private trustees’ actions to Fourteenth 
Amendment scrutiny.40  In any event, the city’s mere resignation as trustee 
did not achieve a constitutional settlement.  Wherever formal title may lie, 
the Court held, the park still retained its public character.41  If they were to 
manage the park, public officials would have to integrate it.   
The Baconsfield saga did not end with the Court’s decision in Newton, 
however.  The Georgia courts held that, in light of Newton’s mandate that 
the park could no longer be maintained on a segregated basis, the trust had 
failed.42  In light of this failure, the park property reverted to Senator Ba-
con’s heirs.43  In order to effectuate the testator’s intent, the heirs planned to 
close the park altogether rather than integrate it.44  The same plaintiffs who 
had sought access to the park in Newton now claimed that the courts should 
have applied the cy pres doctrine to amend the terms of the will by striking 
the racial restrictions, thus opening the park to all without regard to race.45  
The failure to do so, they claimed, resulted in maintenance of a segregated 
facility in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.46   
Justice Black, writing for the Court in Evans v. Abney, appeared 
somewhat sympathetic to this claim: “When a city park is destroyed be-
cause the Constitution requires it to be integrated, there is reason for every-
one to be disheartened.”47  Justice Black also said that “federal courts must 
search out the fact and truth of any proceeding or transaction to determine if 
the Constitution has been violated.”48  Nevertheless, in Abney the Court up-
 
37  Id. at 301. 
38  See id. (noting that the park was “swept, manicured, watered, patrolled, and maintained by the 
city as a public facility for whites only”). 
39  See id. 
40  Id. at 301–02; see also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (applying Fifteenth 
Amendment scrutiny to the administration of elections by a private club); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 
501, 508–09 (1946) (applying First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny to private company town’s re-
strictions on speech).  
41  Newton, 382 U.S. at 302.   
42  Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 436 (1970). 
43  Id. 
44  See id. at 444 (noting that state courts had interpreted Senator Bacon’s will as “embodying a pref-
erence for termination of the park rather than its integration”). 
45  See id. at 439. 
46  See id. at 436–37, 440. 
47  Id. at 443. 
48  Id. at 443–44. 
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held Senator Bacon’s apparent preference that the park be closed rather than 
integrated.49  Foreshadowing future property disposition cases, the Court 
said that Abney was not a case “in which a city holds an absolute fee simple 
title to a public park and then closes that park of its own accord solely to 
avoid the effect of a prior court order directing that the park be integrated as 
the Fourteenth Amendment commands.”50  The Court was not prepared, 
said Justice Black, to declare that even this apparent act of circumvention 
would necessarily be unconstitutional.51  Here, the Court stated, any “dis-
criminatory motivation” had been injected not by any government actor but 
by the testator and his heirs.52  Nor, said the Court,53 was the case controlled 
by Shelley v. Kraemer,54 which invalidated judicial action affirmatively en-
forcing a private scheme of restrictive residential covenants.55  The Court 
held that the effect of the Georgia Supreme Court decision “eliminated all 
discrimination against Negroes in the park by eliminating the park itself.”56  
Thus, any loss occasioned by closure of the park was shared equally by 
blacks and whites.57   
The Abney majority construed the closure of Baconsfield as merely the 
unfortunate result of private racial discrimination.  Justice Brennan, in dis-
sent, saw the case very differently.  He described the discriminatory closing 
of Baconsfield as “permeated with state action,” including express state 
statutory authorization of discriminatory devises, the city’s participation in 
an agreement that provided for a reversion to private heirs in the event the 
park could not be maintained as a segregated facility, the city’s maintenance 
of the park as a segregated facility, and the state court’s enforcement of the 
racial restriction.58  According to Justice Brennan, “No record could present 
a clearer case of the closing of a public facility for the sole reason that the 
public authority that owns and maintains it cannot keep it segregated.”59  
According to Justice Brennan, although it would be permissible to close a 
public park owing to expense or superfluousness, “under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause a State may not close down a public facility solely to avoid its 
duty to desegregate that facility.”60  The closing of Baconsfield, he con-
 
49  Id. at 444.   
50  Id. at 445.   
51  See id. (“assuming arguendo” that such a scenario would violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
52  Id. 
53  Id. 
54  334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
55  Id. at 20; see also Abney, 396 U.S. at 445. 
56  Abney, 396 U.S. at 445.  
57  See id. at 446. 
58  Id. at 454–55 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
59  Id. at 452. 
60  Id. at 453. 
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tended, “conveys an unambiguous message of community involvement in 
racial discrimination” that stigmatized blacks residing in the community.61   
The Baconsfield saga demonstrates some of the core difficulties attend-
ing judicial review of settlement-by-disposition.  On the one hand, official 
divestment would appear on the surface to be an appropriate means of set-
tling equality claims relating to the subject property because the state would 
have fully divested itself of any involvement in the segregation of the park.  
On the other hand, courts must always be mindful of the dangers of circum-
vention and sham transactions.  Newton showed that the Court was willing 
to look behind a formal disposition in order to test the bona fides of public 
divestment in a critical public facility.  Abney demonstrated the limits of 
that intervention, even where the result was the closure of a former public 
park rather than its previously ordered integration.  The decision effectively 
allowed the state to facilitate segregation while disclaiming any responsibil-
ity for it.  Ultimately, the Court accepted the fiction that the closure affected 
whites and blacks equally.  Note that during the Baconsfield saga, the Court 
carefully avoided deciding whether officials could simply close a public 
property, either in response to a judicial integration order or because they 
preferred closure to compliance with constitutional obligations.  That ques-
tion would arise in future equality cases, as well as in more contemporary 
First Amendment disputes.62   
B. Leases of Public Property 
Abney was a rather unusual case, insofar as the city’s involvement 
stemmed from the terms of a private devise.  More commonly, states and 
localities owned the subject properties from the outset.  Rather than inte-
grate these public properties, officials sought to extinguish equality claims 
by privatizing them.  During the civil rights era, local officials faced with 
desegregation orders or political pressure to integrate frequently leased pub-
lic properties to private lessees.  Public officials claimed that the leases ex-
tinguished any constitutional obligation to integrate.  Plaintiffs argued that 
the leases were sham or pretextual transactions, entered into to avoid deseg-
regation decrees or with the intent that segregation continue unabated in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.   
Not surprisingly, in light of Brown’s specific command, courts tended 
to view leasing arrangements involving public school facilities with particu-
lar skepticism.63  For example, the en banc Fifth Circuit disapproved of one 
 
61  Id. at 453–54. 
62  See discussion infra Parts I.D., III.D. 
63  The root problem was that localities subject to desegregation orders often undermined school in-
tegration and encouraged “white flight” by leasing or selling public school buildings and facilities to all-
white academies.  See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973) (noting a dramatic rise in 
private schools in Mississippi following desegregation orders). 
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such leasing arrangement in United States v. Mississippi.64  A school board 
had leased an unused public school facility to a civic association, which in 
turn entered into a sublease with the Sylvarena Baptist Academy, a private 
segregated school.65  The sublease, which was for a term of twenty-five 
years, provided that the Academy would pay an annual rent of five dollars 
to the school’s superintendent.66  The United States Department of Justice 
filed a complaint seeking to have the sublease set aside on the ground that it 
impeded a school desegregation order.67  The district court found that the 
lease between the school board and the association was entered into in good 
faith, without any knowledge by the school board that the building would 
be used for an all-white school.68  The sublease was a different matter.  The 
court found that it had been entered into largely in response to local parental 
objections to desegregation of the public schools.69   
Disagreeing with a panel decision that had allowed the sublease but en-
joined the private school from making admissions decisions based on race, 
the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc set aside the sublease.70  The court ex-
plained that local school districts that attempt to “continue or re-establish 
the previously discarded segregated order through private means [would be] 
prohibited from receiving government largesse in their endeavors.”71  It held 
that the school board had facilitated and encouraged the operation of a pri-
vate segregated school facility by approving the sublease, receiving rent 
under the lease, and retaining a reversionary interest in the property.72  
Whatever the school board’s motive or purpose, the court concluded that 
the arrangement had culminated in an “illicit union of the state with segre-
gated education” that had emanated directly from public opposition to de-
segregation.73  In ordering that the sublease be set aside and the transaction 
unwound, the Fifth Circuit found it particularly noteworthy that, as in a 
prior Supreme Court case overturning a city’s aid to segregated private 
schools, the sublease “operated directly to contravene an outstanding school 
desegregation order.”74  The court also noted the Supreme Court’s earlier 
admonition, in Cooper v. Aaron,75 that the equal protection rights of chil-
dren to attend desegregated schools could not be nullified directly or indi-
 
64  499 F.2d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc). 
65  Id. at 427. 
66  Id. at 428. 
67  Id. at 427. 
68  Id. at 430. 
69  Id.  
70  Id. at 430, 438. 
71  Id. at 428. 
72  Id. at 432. 
73  Id. at 435.     
74  Id. at 436 (quoting Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 568 (1974)).     
75  358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
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rectly “through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted ‘ingen-
iously or ingenuously.’”76     
Skepticism with regard to leasing arrangements extended to recrea-
tional and other public properties as well.  An early district court opinion 
addressing desegregation of public pools summarized what would become 
the prevailing sentiment:  
It is not conceivable that a city can provide the ways and means for a private 
individual or corporation to discriminate against its own citizens.  Having set 
up the swimming pool by authority of the Legislature, the City, if the pool is 
operated, must operate it itself, or, if leased, must see that is it operated with-
out any such discrimination.77   
Thus, civil rights era courts held that officials could not avoid constitu-
tional obligations to integrate city golf courses, courthouse cafeterias, and 
public parks by simply leasing the properties to private individuals or inter-
ests.78        
 In sum, civil rights era courts generally agreed that mere leases of 
public properties like schools, golf courses, swimming pools, and court-
house cafeterias were not sufficient to extinguish constitutional claims.  
Unlike the complete divestment in Abney, municipalities continued to have 
a stake in these private enterprises.  Although the lease agreement itself was 
generally sufficient evidence of state involvement, in most cases munici-
palities were more deeply involved in the joint enterprise.79  In these cases, 
courts were not willing to permit public officials to use a private property 
law mechanism to undermine the constitutional guarantee of equal access to 
public properties.  The courts generally saw leases for what they often 
were—efforts to circumvent or avoid the obligation to desegregate public 
properties. 
 
76  United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d at 437 (quoting Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17).  
77  Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004, 1009 (S.D. W. Va. 1948). 
78  See City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425, 426 (4th Cir. 1957) (upholding an injunction 
prohibiting a city golf course that was under lease to a private golf club from denying access to blacks); 
Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922, 926 (5th Cir. 1956) (upholding an injunction prohibiting a county 
from renewing or extending the lease of a cafeteria located in a county courthouse to a vendor that re-
fused to serve black customers); Dep’t of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615, 616 (4th Cir. 
1956) (per curiam) (upholding a decree requiring that a leased park be operated on a nonsegregated ba-
sis, whether or not it could be so operated profitably).  This principle extended to arrangements that, ei-
ther by express terms of the lease or a requirement that the lessee comply with local laws forbidding 
integration, required lessees to discriminate.  See Recent Developments, Transfer by City Held Effective 
to Avoid Finding of State Action, 16 STAN. L. REV. 197, 199 n.9 (1963) (collecting cases). 
79  See, e.g., Plummer, 240 F.2d at 925–26 (noting that the county not only had provided the court-
house building and services, but also had been aware of the private vendor’s discriminatory practices 
prior to the lease).  As the Supreme Court clarified five years after Plummer, the leased cafeteria was a 
classic symbiotic arrangement between the state and a private actor.  See Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723–26 (1961) (holding that a coffee shop and the state had entered into an inter-
dependent relationship, such that the private shop owner’s racial discrimination constituted state action).  
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C. Sales, Donations, and Other Transfers 
Owing to the fact that leases were not generally considered adequate 
divestments or settlements, officials frequently turned to sales, donations, 
and other transfers of title.  As in the leasing context, some of these disposi-
tions were direct responses to pending desegregation decrees.  Others were 
reactions to local community pressure to resist integration.  The question 
posed by these dispositions was whether the transfer of title extinguished 
any equality obligations with respect to the subject properties. 
As in the leasing context, courts were quite skeptical of local efforts to 
sell or otherwise transfer public school property to private academies or in-
stitutions.  This was true even where the property was characterized by the 
government as surplus, abandoned, or otherwise not financially viable.  In 
Wright v. City of Brighton, for example, the city initially planned to lease, 
but later sold, an abandoned school building to the Hoover Academy, a pri-
vate, all-white school.80  The record established that local officials, who at 
the time were operating under a desegregation order, were fully aware that 
the school property would be used to house a segregated private educational 
facility.81  The Fifth Circuit rescinded the sale on the grounds that the city 
was facilitating and encouraging the establishment of a private segregated 
academy, thereby undermining ongoing efforts to desegregate the local 
schools.82  The disposition was prohibited in Wright even though the prop-
erty had been sold rather than leased, the city was no longer involved in its 
operation, the city provided no financial or other assistance to the private 
facility, and the city had retained no future interest in the property.83  The 
Wright court readily conceded that it could find no precedent finding state 
involvement on similar facts.84  Such support was not necessary, said the 
court, since plaintiffs were challenging not the discriminatory admissions 
policies of the academy but the actual sale itself.85   
In holding that the sale violated the Equal Protection Clause, Wright 
relied on both its purpose and effect.  As to purpose, the court found com-
pelling the uncontroverted evidence that the city knew the purchaser would 
operate a segregated facility.86  Issuing its opinion just prior to Palmer v. 
Thompson, in which the Supreme Court held that motive alone was not dis-
 
80  441 F.2d 447, 448 (5th Cir. 1971).  A district court judge had strongly suggested that under well-
established law, a similar lease arrangement would have violated the Equal Protection Clause.  See id. at 
448–49. 
81  Id. at 452. 
82  Id. at 453.  
83  Id. at 449–50. 
84  Id. at 450. 
85  Id.  
86  Id. at 451. 
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positive in property disposition cases,87 the Fifth Circuit condemned the 
city’s motives in the strongest terms: “The transformation from a leasing ar-
rangement to a sale is almost sardonic in its cynicism and makes it obvious 
that the city was completely aware of the buyer’s racial policies at the time 
the sale was consummated.”88  In assessing the city’s motive or purpose, the 
Wright court reviewed recent desegregation history.  It took into account 
both the civil rights context in general and the particular year leading up to 
the sale (1969), which it described as “a febrile and frenetic year of deseg-
regation freighted with plans for compliance, court decrees, and schemes of 
evasion.”89  The court emphasized that courts were hardly unaware of local 
resistance to desegregation and admonished officials that judges ought not 
to be considered “naively unsophisticated” when it came to local evasion 
and subterfuge.90   
The court also relied on the practical effect of the city’s sale of the 
property, which it said was to further segregation in the schools.91  Ac-
knowledging the symbolic significance of the subject property, the Wright 
court noted that the operation of an all-white school in a formerly public 
school building would “place a special burden and a badge of opprobrium 
on the Negro citizens of Brighton, Alabama.”92   
One year after Wright, the Fifth Circuit decided McNeal v. Tate County 
School District, another case involving the sale of public school property.93  
In McNeal, the local school board advertised for bids on an unused school 
that had been closed for educational and economic reasons.94  The highest 
bid—indeed the only bid—was submitted by a private, segregated acad-
emy.95  The school board sold the property to the academy and executed a 
quitclaim deed.96  In contrast to the facts in Wright, however, the school 
board in McNeal did not know at the time of the sale that the property 
would be used for a private segregated school (although they were aware of 
a local movement to establish private segregated schools).97  The district 
court found that the school board had acted in good faith and in accordance 
with the law in effectuating the sale, had received adequate consideration, 
 
87  See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224, 226 (1971) (holding that the closing of public pools 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).     
88  Wright, 441 F.2d at 452.   
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 453; see also Wright v. Baker County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 131, 134–35 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(rescinding the sale of a surplus public school building to a private segregated academy specifically es-
tablished to counteract the effects of court ordered desegregation). 
91  Wright, 441 F.2d at 451.  
92  Id. at 452.   
93  460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1972), modified on reh’g, 460 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
94  Id. at 570. 
95  Id.  
96  Id. 
97  Id. at 570–71. 
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and had lawfully advertised the sale.98  Moreover, the district court found 
that the sale was not entered into in response to an integration order and that 
the operation of the private academy would not interfere with the effort to 
desegregate the school system.99   
McNeal initially reversed the district court and held that rescission of 
the sale was the appropriate remedy.100  However, perhaps owing to the ab-
sence of bad faith and the district court’s finding that the sale would not in-
terfere with the desegregation of the local school system, the court held on 
rehearing that the sale should be upheld but the private academy should it-
self be required to admit applicants without regard to race.101  Thus, al-
though the sale was not considered a sham, the private purchaser’s future 
use of the school facility was limited by the constitutional right of school-
children to attend without regard to race.  The court did not explain the ba-
sis for imposing this continuing obligation on a private purchaser.  One can 
surmise, however, that it stemmed from the school board’s obligation to 
maintain an integrated school system.102  Although it permitted the sale, on 
rehearing the McNeal court cautioned that future sales of public school 
property “should be scrutinized with the utmost care and caution to the end 
that public school property shall not be converted to use by private schools 
which engage in forbidden discriminatory practices.”103       
During the civil rights era, courts were also called upon to review the 
constitutionality of sales involving recreational properties.  Some desegre-
gation decrees involving such properties contained language forbidding 
disposition of the subject properties except by “bona fide sale.”104  The pro-
visions were inserted to prevent evasion of desegregation orders.105  
Whether a sale or other disposition was bona fide or sham was a fact-
intensive inquiry.  Courts looked at all of the circumstances of the sale, in-




98  Id. at 569; id. at 572, 573 (Gewin, J., dissenting). 
99  McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., No. EC7029-S, 1970 WL 118111, at *5–6 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 
19, 1970). 
100  See McNeal, 460 F.2d at 570–71. 
101  Id. at 574; accord United States v. Mississippi, 499 F.2d 425, 432 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc) 
(opining that the remedy in McNeal was based on the court’s findings that the school board acted in 
good faith and that the sale did not appear to interfere with desegregation). 
102  McNeal, 460 F.2d at 571–72 (noting that school boards “are charged with the affirmative duty to 
take whatever steps might be necessary to bring about a unitary educational system which is free from 
racial discrimination”). 
103  Id. at 574–75.   
104  E.g., City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425, 426 (4th Cir. 1957) (per curiam). 
105  E.g., id. 
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Some courts held that public property dispositions were collusive 
schemes designed to avoid integration.106  Others refused to validate a pro-
posed settlement-by-disposition even where no evidence of bad faith was 
present.  For example, in Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, the Fifth Circuit 
held that the sale of two municipal golf courses to private purchasers did 
not extinguish the equal protection claims of prospective black patrons who 
were denied the right to play based on race.107  Just one day before an in-
junction prohibiting it from operating the courses on a racially segregated 
basis was to take effect, the city closed the golf courses.108  A few months 
later, the city council passed an ordinance authorizing the sale of the two 
properties.109  The council then took bids on terms the court described as 
“very favorable to any prospective purchaser.”110  The purchase prices did, 
however, appear to reflect the properties’ fair market value, and the court 
noted that there was no contention that the sales were made in bad faith; in 
other words, there were no “side agreements or understandings between the 
City and the purchasers to the effect that the purchasers would operate the 
golf courses on a segregated basis if they acquired title to them.”111 
Nevertheless, Hampton held that state action remained present even af-
ter the purchases were effectuated.112  That conclusion was based almost en-
tirely on the presence in both purchase agreements of a reversionary 
clause,113 which provided that in the event the property was used for any 
purpose other than a golf course it would revert to the city or its succes-
sors.114  The court acknowledged that the city was entitled to discontinue 
operation of its golf courses “if it decide[d] for any reason that it no longer 
wishe[d] to [run them].”115  But it was not permitted, the court said, to im-
pose an absolute obligation on the present owners to operate a golf course, 
thereby maintaining what the court characterized as “complete present con-
 
106  See, e.g., Smith v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634, 638–41, 
647–48 (5th Cir. 1972) (affirming a district court decision that the YMCA, which had purchased pools 
and other recreational facilities from the city just prior to the entry of a judicial integration order, was a 
state actor subject to constitutional guarantees of equality). 
107  304 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1962). 
108  Id. (Gewin, J., dissenting). 
109  Id. 
110  Id. at 320 (majority opinion).  By this the court seemed to mean that the sales were effectuated 
based on relatively small down payments and extended payment periods.  Id.  
111  Id. at 321. 
112  See id. at 323. 
113  Id. (“We conclude that the inclusion of the reversionary clause in these conveyances constituted 
the purchasers of the two golf courses state agents, within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
114  See id. at 320–21. 
115  Id. at 322.  It is likely that the court did not mean literally “any” reason, but valid and race-
neutral reasons, such as expense.  
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trol” of the property.116  According to the court, this would be no different 
from entering a long-term lease for a particular purpose with a right of can-
cellation should that purpose not be carried out—a situation courts would 
have no trouble characterizing as state action.117  Although the opinion cer-
tainly was couched in the language of state action, its tenor, including the 
reference to the favorable terms of purchase, strongly suggested that the 
Hampton court viewed the sale as a sham or pretext.  In relying heavily on 
the presence of a future interest in the purchase agreements, the court 
seemed to be stretching the state action doctrine to prevent circumvention 
of the equality guarantee.   
This sort of careful judicial parsing of disposition instruments was not 
uncommon during the civil rights era.  In Eaton v. Grubbs, for example, the 
Fourth Circuit held that the James Walker Memorial Hospital, which the 
city of Wilmington, North Carolina had donated to a private board, re-
mained a state actor subject to the Equal Protection Clause.118  Black physi-
cians and their patients had sued the hospital for denying them admission to 
staff membership and treatment facilities based on their race.119  Six years 
earlier, in a case involving the same parties, the Fourth Circuit had held that 
the conveyance of the hospital to the board had extinguished the equal pro-
tection claims of the physicians and patients.120  In Grubbs, however, the 
court made an independent examination of the relationship between the city 
and the hospital.121  The court found that “[p]erhaps the most significant 
evidence of the state’s involvement in the hospital’s affairs is the presence 
of the reverter clause in the deed.”122  The reverter clause in Grubbs pro-
vided that in the event the property was no longer used as a hospital, it 
would revert to the city.123  While the court viewed the reverter clause as the 
“most significant” evidence of the city’s control of the hospital and quoted 
 
116  Id.  As the dissenting opinion noted, however, a reversionary interest is not commonly consid-
ered a present estate, but rather the possibility of an estate sometime in the future.  Id. at 327–28 (Gewin, 
J., dissenting).  
117  Id. at 322–23 (majority opinion).  In the alternative, like the Supreme Court in Newton, the 
Hampton court relied on a public function theory of state action.  The operation of municipal golf 
courses, the court reasoned, is the performance of a state function; it is, the court opined, the equivalent 
of granting a franchise for public transportation to a local bus company.  Id. 
118  329 F.2d 710, 711–12, 715 (4th Cir. 1964). 
119  Id. at 711. 
120  Eaton v. Bd. of Managers of the James Walker Mem’l Hosp., 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958).  The 
court noted that after the conveyance, the hospital was neither owned nor controlled by the municipality 
and received only 4.5% of its total income from public funds.  Id. at 527.   
121  Grubbs, 329 F.2d at 712.  In doing so, rather than affording the prior case res judicata effect, the 
court noted that both Supreme Court and circuit precedent had changed.  Id.  Among other things, the 
Supreme Court had decided Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), which clari-
fied that the state action inquiry was fact-intensive and that courts must look closely at the mutually 
beneficial relationships involving state and private actors.  See Grubbs, 329 F.2d at 712. 
122  Id. at 713. 
123  Id.  
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Hampton with approval,124 there was also substantial additional evidence of 
state involvement.  Among other things, the hospital was subject to detailed 
city regulations and the city continued to provide for most of its operational 
needs.125  In essence, as in Hampton, the court detected an effort by the state 
to circumvent desegregation obligations without total divestment of public 
interest and control. 
Not all civil rights era courts took such a jaundiced view of settlement-
by-disposition, however.  Hampton and Grubbs suggested that a good faith 
sale, particularly one effectuated without a reversionary clause, might be 
constitutional.  Moreover, even in situations where there was strong evi-
dence that officials were seeking to circumvent desegregation decrees 
through sales or donations, not all courts were willing to hold that the pro-
posed dispositions were shams.  For example, in Wood v. Hogan, a district 
court held that the transfer of a hospital from a municipal authority to a pri-
vate corporation settled equal protection claims by patients that the hospital 
had segregated them by race.126  This was so, according to the court, even 
though the transfer was plainly effectuated to avoid a desegregation order.127  
Other courts, while purporting to engage in close scrutiny of property dis-
positions, also upheld sales and other dispositions that appeared to be at 
least as questionable as those invalidated in Hampton and Grubbs.128     
Civil rights era courts were undoubtedly aware that state and local offi-
cials sometimes, perhaps even often, used private property mechanisms 
such as sales and donations to avoid equality obligations.  However, they 
were also mindful of local officials’ traditional power to dispose of public 
properties.  In light of Brown, courts were most likely to invalidate sales or 
donations of school properties.  Even when the disposition was allowed, 
moreover, courts sometimes imposed equality obligations on the private 
purchasers of school properties.  The treatment of recreational properties 
was less uniform.  In assessing the bona fides of these dispositions, some 
courts invalidated even facially valid sales and donations on the thinnest of 
grounds—including the mere retention of a future property interest by the 
state or locality.  Other courts seemed to be satisfied that constitutional re-
quirements had been met so long as title formally changed hands.  Although 
courts were gaining an education with regard to local civil rights evasion, 
judicial review of sales and donations of public properties tended to be a 
fact-specific and ad hoc reaction to local tactics.  The decisions generally 
 
124  See id. at 714 (quoting Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1962)). 
125  Id. at 714–15. 
126  215 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Va. 1963). 
127  See id. at 56.  Interestingly enough, the same judge earlier had endorsed patient segregation on 
the ground that it would benefit the health of the patients.  See Wood v. Vaughn, 209 F. Supp. 106, 116 
(W.D. Va. 1962). 
128  See, e.g., Tonkins v. City of Greensboro, 276 F.2d 890, 891–92 (4th Cir. 1960) (upholding the 
sale of a municipal pool at public auction to a corporation formed with the assistance of a city official 
who had opposed integration of the pool). 
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did not convey the sense that public officials were different from ordinary 
sellers, nor, outside the schools context, did they acknowledge the strong 
community resistance to desegregation and the powerful symbolism that 
segregated privatized properties conveyed.             
D. Closures 
As discussed, sales, donations, and other transfers of public property to 
private owners did not always settle equal protection concerns.  If all other 
dispositions failed, municipalities had one more option.  Governments are 
not constitutionally required to own or maintain public properties and facili-
ties.  Thus, officials appear to have the option of closing the public property 
or facility altogether.  Indeed, Abney suggested that closing a public park to 
all residents might satisfy the equality guarantee—perhaps even if the clo-
sure followed an integration order.129  Although closure was a drastic dispo-
sition in many respects, particularly since it would deprive entire 
communities of the use of certain public properties, officials sometimes re-
sorted to closure in an effort to circumvent equal access obligations.   
Closure of public school properties posed the gravest threat to desegre-
gation.  During the 1950s and 1960s, both the lower courts and the Supreme 
Court encountered public school closure laws.  Lower courts held that offi-
cials could not constitutionally close only those schools subject to desegre-
gation orders, while maintaining other facilities of a like kind.130  In 1961, 
the Supreme Court affirmed a lower court judgment that held unconstitu-
tional several Louisiana laws empowering the governor to close any school 
ordered to integrate, and to close all state schools if any were integrated.131  
Three years later, in Griffin v. County School Board, the Supreme Court 
held that Prince Edward County could not constitutionally close its public 
schools while contributing financial support to private segregated white 
schools that took their place.132  Thus, it was made clear that maintenance of 
dual school systems violated the Equal Protection Clause.  The courts held 
that these purported settlements offended the prohibition on dual school 
systems and would have had the purpose and effect of discriminating based 
on race.   
Although the threat of school closures was present, the Court never 
ruled directly on whether a state or locality could simply shutter all of its 
public schools.  In the end, although many Southern officials threatened to 
 
129  Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 445 (1970). 
130  See, e.g., Allen v. County Sch. Bd., 207 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Va. 1962); James v. Almond, 170 F. 
Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959).   
131  Orleans Parish Sch. Bd. v. Bush, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (per curiam), aff’g 187 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. 
La. 1960).  
132  377 U.S. 218, 231–34 (1964). 
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close the public schools, none actually exercised this drastic option.133  Had 
they done so, the Court would have been faced with a ripe conflict between 
two fundamental principles: On the one hand, Brown guaranteed equal ac-
cess to education, but on the other hand, the Constitution did not require 
that states maintain public school systems at all.  As Michael Klarman has 
observed, one of the primary reasons Southern officials did not carry 
through with their public closure threats is that white Southerners, particu-
larly parents with school-aged children, had calculated the costs of closure 
and were simply not willing to pay them.134  Democratic limits, most impor-
tantly a public unwilling to go along with this gambit, were thus the pri-
mary obstacle to this particular form of circumvention-by-disposition.135   
Closure was a more viable option with regard to other public proper-
ties, however.  In the 1960s, some lower courts had assumed that munici-
palities could close recreational facilities, even in the face of a judicial order 
to desegregate them.136  The Supreme Court was late in addressing the issue.  
In Palmer v. Thompson, decided in 1971, the Court upheld the decision of 
the City Council of Jackson, Mississippi, to halt operation of five public 
swimming pools.137  The vote to close the pools was taken after a federal 
district court had declared segregation of the city’s recreational facilities to 
be unconstitutional.138  Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Black 
found that while the closures constituted state action, they did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment.139   
Justice Black began with the fundamental proposition that “neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor any Act of Congress purports to impose an af-
firmative duty on a State to begin to operate or to continue to operate 
swimming pools.”140  He noted that the district court had accepted the city’s 
explanation that the pools were closed owing to a combination of economic 
and public safety concerns.141  Nor was it the case, he said, that in Jackson 
 
133  See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290–421 (2004) (recounting Southern efforts to gain support for pub-
lic school closure laws).  
134  Id. at 417–19. 
135  Id. at 416–19. 
136  See, e.g., Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (upholding 
a trial court’s refusal to hold the city in contempt for closing public swimming pools after a permanent 
injunction had been entered ordering that the pools be desegregated); City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 
277 F.2d 364  (5th Cir. 1960) (upholding the closure of city parks under similar circumstances).  
137  403 U.S. 217, 218–19 (1971).  One pool, which the city had leased from the YMCA, was re-
turned to the YMCA and was subsequently operated by it on a segregated basis.  Id. at 222.  Another 
pool was eventually purchased by Jackson State College.  Id.  The three other city pools were closed 
down completely.  See id. at 220.  Many other city recreational facilities remained open and were operat-
ing on a desegregated basis.  See id. at 220 n.5. 
138  Id. at 219. 
139  Id. at 220, 224–26. 
140  Id. at 220. 
141  Id. at 225. 
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“whites [we]re permitted to use public facilities while blacks [we]re denied 
access.”142  The majority claimed the record contained nothing to discredit 
the city’s claim that it had “completely and finally ceased running swim-
ming pools for all time.”143  The city thus was neither involved in the opera-
tion of the pools, nor responsible for encouraging those operating the pools 
to discriminate.144  In sum, the Court held that the city council had settled or 
avoided the equality controversy by eliminating the public facility itself.   
Palmer has become perhaps best known for the Court’s statements 
concerning judicial review of official motives.145  Petitioners claimed that 
Jackson’s decision to close the pools was motivated solely by a desire to 
avoid a judicial integration order.146  Justice Black flatly (though arguably 
incorrectly)147 stated that “no case in this Court has held that a legislative act 
may violate equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men 
who voted for it.”148  The Court relied in particular on United States v. 
O’Brien,149 a First Amendment case decided three years earlier in which it 
had emphasized the difficulties inherent in motive analysis.150  The Palmer 
Court also recast prior decisions, in which motive seemed to be critical to 
the outcome, as based not on motive but on the actual effects of the laws in 
question.151  In the end, the majority accepted the city’s race-neutral expla-
nation for the closure.152  In separate concurrences, Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Blackmun both expressed concerns regarding the adoption of a rule 
“that every public facility or service, once opened, constitutionally ‘locks 
in’ the public sponsor so that it may not be dropped.”153     
Justice White wrote a vigorous dissent, joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, in which he disagreed that the pool closings were racially neutral.  
 
142  Id. at 220. 
143  Id. at 222. 
144  Id. at 222–24. 
145  See Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 99–102 (discussing the Palmer Court’s approach to governmental 
motives).  On the subject of legislative motives, see also John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative 
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208–12 (1970), which discusses cases in a vari-
ety of doctrinal areas that, beginning in the 1920s, involved the Court in motive inquiries.    
146  Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224. 
147  See Brest, supra note 145, at 99–100 (characterizing prior equal protection cases as turning on 
legislative motive).   
148  Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224. 
149  391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
150  See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224–25 (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383, 384) (noting the difficulty in 
ascertaining legislative motive and the futility of invalidating acts based on improper motive). 
151  Id. at 225.  For example, the Court described Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960), 
in which a racial gerrymander had been invalidated, as a decision based upon the effect that virtually all 
blacks had been excluded from voting in town elections rather than one based upon the motive of the 
drafters of the racial gerrymander.  Palmer, 403 U.S. at 225. 
152  See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 226. 
153  Id. at 228 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also id. at 229–30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1384 
He interpreted the pool closings as “an expression of official policy that 
Negroes are unfit to associate with whites.”154  In contrast to the majority, 
Justice White was not at all troubled by judicial review of official motives; 
indeed, he noted that federal civil rights laws often explicitly demand proof 
of defendants’ motive or animus.155  After describing at some length Jack-
son’s longstanding resistance to desegregation orders in various contexts,156 
Justice White concluded that its economic and public safety rationales were 
entirely pretextual.  City officials had simply determined, he said, that com-
pliance with the desegregation order “would be intolerable to Jackson’s 
citizens.”157  Justice White concluded: “State action predicated solely on 
opposition to a lawful court order to desegregate is a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws.”158   
Palmer, like Abney, demonstrated that there were limits to judicial re-
view of settlement-by-disposition.  The outcomes in both cases suggested 
that so long as they were willing to do without certain facilities, local offi-
cials could simply close them to the public.  The closure had the effect of 
extinguishing all constitutional claims of equal access.  In so holding, the 
Court refused to apply the same skepticism to pool closures that it had ap-
plied to school closures.  In Palmer, Justice Black attempted to distinguish 
the school cases on the grounds that operating the schools was a more im-
portant enterprise than operating the public pools and that school boards 
were not attempting to actually close their schools but to operate dual sys-
tems.159  But the majority did not explain why outright closure, particularly 
in the face of an integration order, was considered less constitutionally 
problematic than unequal access.  Nor, in focusing narrowly on the terms of 
divestment, did it respond to Justice White’s concerns regarding the dis-
criminatory symbolism and disregard of minority rights that resulted from 
the closure.  In the end, Palmer allowed public officials to avoid constitu-
tional obligations and judicial integration orders so long as they articulated 
facially plausible economic or public safety reasons for their actions.  Al-
though subsequent doctrinal developments have called Palmer’s equal pro-
tection analysis into question,160 the case has never been expressly 
overruled.   
 
154  Id. at 240–41 (White, J., dissenting).   
155  See id. at 241–42. 
156  See id. at 243–50. 
157  Id. at 255; accord id. at 254 (“[T]here can be no disagreement that the desegregation rul-
ing . . . was the event that precipitated the city’s decision to cease furnishing public swimming facilities 
to its citizens.”). 
158  Id. at 265. 
159  Id. at 221 n.6. 
160  When Palmer was decided, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified that intent or purpose was 
the touchstone of a racial discrimination claim.  See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) 
(holding that disparate impact alone does not make out an equal protection claim).  Today, intent or pur-
pose is the primary focus of an equal protection claim.  See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN 
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As this examination of civil rights era cases demonstrates, the conflict 
between the state’s authority to dispose of public properties and the protec-
tion of constitutional liberties that depend upon access to them is a long-
standing concern.  During this period, state and local officials often treated 
public properties as expendable in the face of equality claims.  They dis-
posed of properties to facilitate local majority preferences in favor of segre-
gation.  In terms of protecting equal access to public properties, the legacy 
of the civil rights courts was decidedly mixed.  Circumvention-by-
disposition was generally thwarted with regard to the schools, but was 
sometimes permitted with regard to other properties.  As they moved from 
leases to sales to outright closures, courts eventually acceded to officials’ 
dispositions.  To be sure, a few courts stretched mightily to hold public of-
ficials accountable for what they saw as sham transactions.  It ultimately 
became clear, however, that like any other owner of property states and lo-
calities could divest themselves of assets.  Palmer suggested that even when 
executed in the face of judicial integration orders, such property divest-
ments might represent legitimate constitutional settlements.  In assessing 
the bona fides of a wide variety of property dispositions, civil rights era 
courts were sometimes remiss in emphasizing that public officials owed 
specific duties under the Equal Protection Clause to comply with integra-
tion orders, to preserve public facilities, and to protect minority rights to use 
public properties even in the face of public opposition.         
II. PROPERTY DISPOSITION AND ESTABLISHMENT CONTROVERSIES 
The civil rights era provided the courts with their first sustained look at 
settlement-by-disposition.  The practice has recently resurfaced in the Es-
tablishment Clause context.  Public officials have increasingly turned to 
property dispositions as a means of settling or avoiding establishment 
claims and controversies.  Thus, rather than remove publicly displayed 
symbols that courts have found to violate the Establishment Clause, offi-
cials have privatized the public parcels and symbols.  They also have occa-
sionally privatized public forum properties, including public streets, in 
order to avoid Establishment Clause concerns.161  In addition, public law 
mechanisms such as eminent domain have been used to transfer ownership 
of public properties at the center of establishment controversies.162  As they 
did in civil rights era equality cases, courts have struggled to identify the 
constitutional limits of settlement-by-disposition in the establishment area.  
                                                                                                                           
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1504 n.23 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that “[a]lthough the formal obituary has not yet 
been published, Palmer has been quietly but unmistakably buried” by Davis (citations omitted)). 
161  See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1259–63 (10th Cir. 2005) (up-
holding the sale of a public easement to a church). 
162  See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202, 1218 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (upholding 
the federal acquisition, through the exercise of eminent domain, of a parcel of land containing a cross to 
be designated as a national monument). 
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In Salazar v. Buono, its most recent encounter with settlement-by-
disposition in the establishment area, the Supreme Court declined to make 
any “sweeping pronouncements” or announce any “categorical rules.”163   
A. Privatization and Religious Symbols  
The constitutional standards relating to displays of religious symbols 
on public land are notoriously murky.  To oversimplify matters, the Su-
preme Court has indicated that sectarian symbols generally must be dis-
played along with some secular elements in order to avoid the 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion under the Establishment Clause.164  
Thus, a statue of the Ten Commandments may not be displayed on its own, 
but may be included in a display of collected foundational legal and histori-
cal documents.165  The display of unaccompanied religious symbols such as 
crosses, statues of Jesus Christ, and depictions of the Ten Commandments 
on public land will generally violate the Establishment Clause.  The ques-
tion then becomes what remedial action must be taken to cure the violation.   
Public officials have at least four options when they are faced with a 
valid objection to the display of a religious symbol on public property or 
have been ordered by a court to remove the display.166  First, they can sim-
ply remove the symbol,167 which was the traditional response in such situa-
tions.168  Second, where feasible, officials might alter the public display so 
that it comports with the Establishment Clause.169  Third, assuming it can be 
 
163  Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1820 (2010). 
164  McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 850–51, 874–76 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 684 (2005); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 679–80 (1984). 
165  See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 874 (observing that sacred text may be displayed in the com-
pany of other legal or historical documents). 
166  A fifth possible option, adopting the religious symbol as government speech, is discussed below.  
See infra Part III.E. 
167  Some have argued that removal ought not to be ordered by a court where it cannot be done with-
out substantially damaging or destroying the symbol.  See Jordan C. Budd, Cross Purposes: Remedying 
the Endorsement of Symbolic Religious Speech, 82 DENV. U. L. REV. 183, 229–30 (2004). 
168  See id. at 186 (noting that “until relatively recently, unconstitutional displays were simply re-
moved from public land in the typical case—a remedy that directly resolved the violation without need 
for elaborate judicial analysis”).  See generally Christopher Lauderman, Note, Building a Fence of Sepa-
ration: The Constitutional Validity of Land Transfers in Escaping from Establishment Clause Viola-
tions, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1193, 1201–06 (2008) (discussing cases involving land transfers and 
religious symbols).  
169  See, e.g., McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 850 (considering a Kentucky courthouse’s display of 
the Ten Commandments modified and supplemented with displays of other religious and historical texts 
to create a collective display purporting to present the foundations for Kentucky’s laws).  This option 
may be somewhat questionable after McCreary County.  There the Court held that McCreary County’s 
original sectarian purpose in erecting a Ten Commandments display was not cured by later seculariza-
tion of the display.  Id. at 871–72.  But the Court also added that the county’s past actions did not “for-
ever taint” any public display of a religious symbol.  Id. at 873–74.  Thus, it appears that where the 
original purpose was severely tainted, secularization will not suffice.  Where a display is not invalidated 
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done without destroying or substantially damaging the display, officials 
might relocate the symbol to private property.  Lately, however, officials 
increasingly have resorted to a fourth option: privatizing the underlying 
property.  Rather than remove or relocate sectarian symbols, local and fed-
eral officials have sold the public parcels on which they are located to pri-
vate owners.  Officials claim that these dispositions settle any 
Establishment Clause controversies because they extinguish any anti-
establishment obligations with respect to the properties.   
As was true during the civil rights era, the cases in this area demon-
strate that some courts are aware of the possibility that officials might at-
tempt to circumvent constitutional obligations by disposing of public 
properties.  As the Seventh Circuit stated in Freedom from Religion Foun-
dation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield, a formalist approach that bases the valid-
ity of an Establishment Clause settlement solely upon the locus of title after 
disposition “invites manipulation.”170  Still, courts have not generally re-
viewed settlement-by-disposition in this context with any deep skepticism.  
Indeed, the presumption seems to be that such dispositions constitute valid 
constitutional settlements.  As the court stated in Marshfield, “Absent un-
usual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective way for a public 
body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.”171  The cases indi-
cate that the facts must be truly extraordinary for a purported settlement-by-
disposition to be invalidated.   
For example, in Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, La Crosse Aerie 
1254, the Seventh Circuit upheld the sale of a Ten Commandments monu-
ment and the parcel on which it was located.172  Installed in 1965 in order to 
honor the flood-fighting efforts of area youth, the monument was located in 
a corner of the 1.5 acre Cameron Park (in La Crosse, Wisconsin), directly 
across from the Fraternal Order of Eagles (FOE) headquarters.173  The city 
expended no funds maintaining the display.174  In 2001, residents asked that 
the monument be moved, but the city refused.175  After then declining three 
separate offers from different groups to take the monument and move it to 
another location,176  the city council passed a resolution indicating that it in-
tended to keep the monument in its current location.177  To effectuate this, 
                                                                                                                           
on purpose grounds, however, but rather based upon its effects, secularization may remain a viable op-
tion.   
170  203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000). 
171  Id.  
172  395 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 2005). 
173  Id. at 694–95. 
174  Id. at 696. 
175  Id.  A previous lawsuit, filed in 1987, was dismissed for lack of standing.  See Freedom from 
Religion Found., Inc. v. Zielke, 663 F. Supp. 606, 614 (W.D. Wis. 1987), aff’d 845 F.2d 1463 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
176  See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 696.  
177  Id. 
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the city decided to sell the monument to the FOE, along with a twenty-foot 
by twenty-two-foot parcel of land around the monument.178  A lawsuit chal-
lenging the display was filed on July 1, 2002.179  Ten days later, the city 
council adopted a resolution authorizing the sale of the parcel to FOE for 
fair market value.180 
As legal authority for the sale, the city council cited a Wisconsin law 
that allowed such sales when parkland was no longer needed for park pur-
poses, a fact the city council had found with regard to the subject parcel.181  
The FOE erected a four-foot-high steel fence around the parcel, which was 
bordered on three sides by a public park and on the other by a public side-
walk.182  It later added signs on all sides of the fence indicating that the par-
cel was private land and that the monument was dedicated to the flood 
volunteers.183  The city then erected its own fence around the fenced-in par-
cel and placed signs on the north and south sides of the fence stating that 
the property was not owned by the city and that the city did not endorse 
“the religious expression thereon.”184           
The district court held that the display as it existed prior to the sale vio-
lated the Establishment Clause, and that the sale itself constituted an inde-
pendent violation of the Establishment Clause.185  It ordered that the plot of 
land be returned to the city and the monument be removed from the park.186  
The Seventh Circuit reversed.187  It rejected the claim that the impending 
lawsuit, along with the city’s rejection of three separate offers to move the 
monument, demonstrated an improper purpose to endorse religion by keep-
ing the symbol in its present location.188  According to the court, removal 
was an option but not a requirement.189  Moreover, the court said that the 
“desire to keep the Monument in place c[ould not] automatically be labeled 
a constitutional violation.”190  At the same time, the court claimed that it 
was not “endorsing a non-remedial initiative designed to sell off patches of 
government land to various religious denominations as a means of circum-
venting the Establishment Clause.”191   
 
178  Id. 
179  Id. 
180  Id. at 697. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
183  Id. 
184  Id. at 697–98. 
185  Id.  
186  Id. 
187  Id. at 705–06. 
188  Id. at 702. 
189  Id. 
190  Id. 
191  Id. 
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Emphasizing the fact-specific nature of Establishment Clause inquiries, 
the court then analyzed whether the sale involved any “unusual circum-
stances,” i.e., a failure to comply with local laws governing land sales, “a 
sale to a straw purchaser that left the City with continuing power to exercise 
the duties of ownership[,] or a sale well below fair market value.”192  The 
court found that none of the indicia of a sham transaction were present.193  It 
noted that the FOE had a “long-standing and important relationship with the 
Monument,” and thus it made “practical sense” for the city to sell it to the 
group.194  Finally, the court emphasized that the location and post-
disposition physical characteristics of the monument presented little danger 
of public misperception regarding ownership or endorsement.195  In a 
strongly worded dissent, Judge Bauer stressed the city’s “stubborn refusal 
to separate itself from the display of a purely religious monument.”196  The 
property disposition, he claimed, “border[ed] on a fraud.”197  Judge Bauer 
denounced the city’s disclaimer as “an obvious sham.”198      
Similarly, in Chambers v. Frederick, a district court refused to enjoin 
the display of a Ten Commandments monument on a parcel that had been 
sold by the city to a different chapter of the FOE (once again the original 
donor).199  Although the city’s facilities administrator had failed to comply 
with local law requiring that the sale be publicly advertised and accepted, 
the court refused to declare that the sale was a sham.200  The court empha-
sized the apparent sincerity of officials who sought to “dissociate” the city 
from the monument by privatizing it, including the facilities administrator 
who had mistakenly concluded that the sale was not subject to the public 
advertising requirement.201  A reasonable observer, the court concluded, 
would understand that the city’s sale of the property was intended to resolve 
the constitutional issues raised by display of a religious monument on pub-
lic property.202  
 
192  Id.  
193  Id. at 702–03. 
194  Id. at 703. 
195  Id. at 702–03.  The court also held that the sale had a secular purpose and did not have the effect 
of endorsing religion, as required under Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  Mercier, 395 F.3d at 
704–05.   
196  Mercier, 395 F.3d at 706 (Bauer, J., dissenting).  
197  Id. 
198  Id. 
199  373 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570, 573 (D. Md. 2005). 
200  Id. at 572–73. 
201  Id. at 572. 
202  Id. at 573; see also Kong v. City of San Francisco, 18 F. App’x 616, 618 (9th Cir. 2001) (up-
holding the display of a cross atop Mt. Davidson, where abutting public park property and the private 
parcel upon which the cross was displayed were visually and physically distinct, and the cross was ac-
companied by signs stating that it had been sold to a private group in order “to comply with a federal 
court decision holding that the presence of the cross on public land violated the California Constitu-
tion”).  In Kong, the panel majority did not consider it significant that the property had been sold with a 
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In Marshfield itself, the court refused to invalidate the sale of the prop-
erty but rather held only that the continued display of a fifteen-foot marble 
statue of Jesus Christ in a public park was prohibited absent additional 
signage and fencing.203  The statue at issue in Marshfield had been located 
in the public park for thirty-nine years before a local resident filed a lawsuit 
claiming that the display violated the Establishment Clause.204  Soon there-
after, a private organization offered to purchase the statue and the 0.15 acres 
of land on which it was located.205  As required by Wisconsin law, the city 
solicited bids for the statue and property.206  Upon accepting the organiza-
tion’s bid, the city executed a warranty deed that included a restrictive 
covenant requiring that the parcel be used for public park purposes.207  After 
the sale, the city stopped providing electrical service to the parcel.208  Al-
though the parcel on which the statue was located was not visibly differen-
tiated from other city park property, prior to the sale the city had erected a 
disclaimer stating that the location of the statue did not represent an en-
dorsement of any religious sect or belief.209  The disclaimer remained on the 
property after the sale, and the parties stipulated that the sale complied with 
all local laws.210 
In arguing that the mere transfer of title did not extinguish the estab-
lishment conflict because in effect it was a “sweetheart deal” designed to 
circumvent the Establishment Clause,211 plaintiffs relied on Evans v. New-
ton, in which the substitution of private trustees was held not to have cured 
the equal protection violation.212  The court interpreted Newton as a “public 
function” case but in any event concluded that the continuing excessive in-
volvement between the government and private actors in Newton was not 
present in Marshfield.213  Indeed, the court concluded that the only possible 
indicator of continuing governmental involvement with the property in 
Marshfield was the presence of the restrictive covenant in the deed.214  Part-
ing company with civil rights era cases like Hampton and Grubbs, the court 
held that this was an insufficient basis for either finding continuing state in-
                                                                                                                           
restrictive covenant requiring that the land remain open to the public.  Kong, 18 F. App’x at 617–18.  
But see id. at 618–19 (Canby, J., concurring) (emphasizing the restrictive covenant). 
203  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 497 (7th Cir. 2000).   
204  Id. at 489. 
205  Id. at 489–90. 
206  Id. at 490. 
207  Id. 
208  Id. 
209  Id. at 489. 
210  Id. at 490, 492. 
211  Id. at 491. 
212  Id. at 491–92 (citing Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966)). 
213  Id. at 492.  
214  Id. at 492–93. 
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volvement or voiding the transfer and concluded that the form of the trans-
action was not objectionable.215      
Finding the form of the transaction to be valid, the Marshfield court 
went on to assess the substance or effect of the disposition, i.e., whether, 
even after the sale, the display of the statue on private property was an un-
constitutional endorsement of religion.  Based on the general location of the 
statue, the physical layout of the park, and the location and orientation of 
the statue, the court held that a reasonable observer would perceive that the 
statue remained part of the city park and continued to constitute government 
endorsement of religion.216  Given that no other displays had ever been pre-
sent in the park—indeed, the record suggested that the park was built for 
the purpose of displaying the statue—the court concluded that the statue’s 
presence likely would be perceived by a reasonable observer as govern-
ment, rather than private, endorsement of religion.217  As for a remedy, the 
Seventh Circuit observed that either the owners had to remove the statue—
an option that would obviously limit private speech in a public forum—or 
find “some way . . . to differentiate between property owned by the [private 
owner] and property owned by the City.”218  According to the court, the lat-
ter option was the “appropriate solution.”219  The court recommended the 
construction of “some defining structure, such as a permanent gated fence 
or wall, to separate City property from [private] property accompanied by a 
clearly visible disclaimer.”220  Ultimately, this was the remedy adopted on 
remand.221   
Thus, prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Salazar v. 
Buono,222 lower courts seemed to have settled on a few basic principles.  As 
Marshfield suggested, absent very unusual circumstances privatization 
would be considered an appropriate settlement of Establishment Clause is-
sues relating to the display of religious symbols on public property.  A bona 
fide sale, which is one that complies with local land disposition require-
ments, has generally been considered an appropriate means of terminating 
establishment claims.  As Marshfield also indicated, the fact that the gov-
ernment retains a reversionary or other future interest in the property does 
not constitute grounds for voiding the transaction.223  However, in order to 
ensure that no continuing endorsement was present, Marshfield and other 
 
215  Id.   
216  Id. at 494–95. 
217  Id. at 495. 
218  Id. at 497. 
219  Id.   
220  Id.     
221  The district court ordered that a four-foot-high wrought-iron fence and disclaimers be installed at 
the site.  Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, No. 98-C-270-S, 2000 WL 767376, 
at *2 (W.D. Wis. May 9, 2000). 
222  130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
223  Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 492–93. 
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decisions required some post-disposition review of the circumstances relat-
ing to the display.224  So long as adequate measures were taken to ensure 
that a reasonable observer would not attribute the post-disposition display 
to the government, Establishment Clause concerns were considered settled.   
Against expectations that Buono would clarify the constitutional valid-
ity of settlement-by-disposition, the Court issued a fractured opinion that set 
forth no categorical rule.225  Buono arose from some rather unusual circum-
stances.  The case involves a congressional, rather than a local, disposition 
of public parkland.  In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars erected a memo-
rial to fallen service members in the form of a wooden Latin cross set atop a 
rock outcropping in the Mojave National Preserve located in southeastern 
California.226  Although the site once had a plaque commemorating veter-
ans, the cross involved in the dispute sat alone on the property.227   
Although the cross is between five and eight feet tall and is located in a 
remote part of the 1.6-million-acre preserve, it can be seen from a secon-
dary road.228  In 1999, the National Park Service (NPS) considered remov-
ing the cross.229  The following year, Congress prohibited the NPS from 
spending any federal funds to do so.230  In 2001, Frank Buono, a retired Na-
tional Park Service employee, filed suit claiming that the display of the 
cross violated the Establishment Clause.231  In January 2002, Congress des-
ignated the cross and any acreage associated with it as a national war me-
morial, directed the Secretary of the Interior to expend up to $10,000 to 
acquire a replica of the original cross and its memorial plaque, and further 
directed the Secretary to install a memorial plaque at a suitable location.232   
In July 2002, the district court permanently enjoined the federal gov-
ernment from permitting the display of the cross.233  Three months later, 
Congress enacted a statute barring the use of federal funds to “dismantle na-
tional memorials commemorating United States participation in World War 
I.”234  While an appeal from the district court’s injunction was pending—in 
 
224  See id. at 497; see also, e.g., Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, La Crosse Aerie 1254, 395 
F.3d 693, 702–03 (7th Cir. 2005) (examining the post-disposition physical characteristics of the monu-
ment and their effect on public perception regarding ownership and endorsement).  
225  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803. 
226  Id. at 1811.   
227  Id. at 1812.  Shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the cross was stolen from the site.  Randal 
C. Archibold, Cross at Center of Legal Dispute Disappears, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at A15, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/12/us/12cross.html. 
228  Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1811–12.   
229  Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom., Salazar v. 
Buono (Buono), 130 S. Ct. 18 (2010). 
230  See Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 133, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-230.  
231  Buono v. Norton (Buono I), 212 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d, 371 F.3d 543 
(9th Cir. 2004). 
232  Act of Jan. 10, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-117, § 8137(a), (c), 115 Stat. 2230, 2278–79.  
233  See Buono I, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. 
234  Act of Oct. 23, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-248, § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1519, 1551. 
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fact, one month after oral argument but before the appellate decision was 
issued235—Congress enacted legislation ordering the Department of the Inte-
rior to convey the land upon which the cross is displayed to the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars in exchange for a privately owned five-acre parcel of land lo-
cated elsewhere in the preserve.236  The transfer statute provided that “[i]f 
the Secretary determines that the conveyed property is no longer being 
maintained as a war memorial, the property shall revert to the ownership of 
the United States.”237   
Without deciding whether the proposed land swap would avoid any 
constitutional controversy, the Ninth Circuit held that the display as it then 
existed violated the Establishment Clause.238  On remand, the district court 
held that the proposed disposition was “an attempt by the government to 
evade the permanent injunction” enjoining display of the cross and, in any 
event, did not cure the Establishment Clause violation.239  The district court 
permanently enjoined the government from effectuating the transfer.240   
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.241  It held that the disposition violated the 
Establishment Clause in both form and substance.  The court concluded that 
the various congressional statutes, which designated the land as a national 
memorial, provided for federal management and supervision of the site, and 
secured an easement for certain purposes, evinced post-disposition “con-
tinuing government control” of the property.242  Relying on Hampton and 
Grubbs, the court construed the reversionary provision as granting the gov-
ernment an automatic property interest if the property ceased to be used as a 
war memorial, which was comprised “at this juncture . . . [of] the cross it-
self.”243  According to the court, these facts demonstrated that the organiza-
tion was a “straw” purchaser through which the government sought to 
circumvent the injunction.244  It concluded that the government’s “long-
standing efforts to preserve and maintain the cross” led to the “undeniable 
conclusion that the government’s purpose in this case is to evade the injunc-
 
235  See Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono IV), 502 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). 
236  Act of Sept. 30, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-87, § 8121(a)–(b), 117 Stat. 1054, 1100. 
237  Id. § 8121(e).  
238  Buono v. Norton (Buono II), 371 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2004). 
239  Buono v. Norton (Buono III), 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d sub nom., 
Buono v. Kempthorne (Buono V), 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom., Salazar v. Buono 
(Buono), 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
240  Buono III, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1182. 
241  Buono V, 527 F.3d at 783. 
242  See id. at 779. 
243  Id. at 780.  The court also noted that the means of transfer did not comport with federal laws and 
regulations governing federal land exchanges: no hearing was held, bidding was not open to the general 
public, and the appropriations bill directed that the land be conveyed to the organization that originally 
installed the Latin cross on the property.  Id. at 781. 
244  Id. at 781–82. 
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tion and keep the cross in place.”245  The court held that the proposed dispo-
sition, which would “leave a little donut hole of land with a cross in the 
midst of a vast federal preserve,” did not settle or avoid the Establishment 
Clause violation.246  Accordingly, it upheld the district court’s injunction or-
dering that the cross not be displayed.247   
In a fractured decision,248 the Supreme Court remanded the case to the 
district court for a determination as to whether the land transfer statute con-
stituted an independent violation of the Establishment Clause rather than 
merely an attempted evasion of the district court’s injunction.249  Justice 
Kennedy, writing for himself and the Chief Justice, and joined in part by 
Justice Alito, held that the district court had erred by failing to determine 
whether the land transfer statute settled the establishment controversy by 
eliminating any endorsement of religion by the federal government.250  The 
plurality strongly hinted that settlement-by-disposition had occurred.  Jus-
tice Kennedy questioned whether the “reasonable observer” standard con-
tinued to be the appropriate framework after the subject property had been 
privatized, but ultimately opined that on remand the district court would 
need to determine whether a reasonable observer’s impression would have 
changed once he became aware of Congress’s “policy of accommodation” 
represented by the land transfer statute.251  He also suggested that after the 
disposition the cross conveyed a secular message of respect for fallen sol-
diers.252   
Justice Kennedy disclaimed any attempt to state “categorical rules” re-
garding settlement-by-disposition.253  However, his opinion strongly urged 
the district court to defer to “Congress’s prerogative to balance opposing in-
terests and its institutional competence”254 and “to consider less drastic re-
lief than complete invalidation of the land-transfer statute.”255  The plurality 
appeared quite sympathetic to Congress’s “dilemma” and its effort to ac-
commodate both the terms of the injunction and the sentiments of those for 
whom the cross was a secular token of appreciation for fallen soldiers.256  In 
a separate concurrence, Justice Alito opined that the Court should have de-
 
245  Id. at 782. 
246  Id. at 768, 782. 
247  Id. at 783. 
248  Six separate opinions were filed in the case.  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010). 
249  Id. at 1819–20. 
250  Id. at 1818–21. 
251  Id. at 1819–20. 
252  See id. at 1820. 
253  Id.  
254  Id. at 1817. 
255  Id. at 1820. 
256  See id. at 1817 (noting Congress’s “dilemma” and observing that “Congress adopted a policy 
with respect to land it now owns in order to resolve a specific controversy”). 
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cided that Congress had legitimately and finally settled the establishment 
claim through the land transfer statute.257   
In the principal dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg 
and Sotomayor, argued that the district court had properly determined that 
the land transfer statute did not cure the Establishment Clause violation 
identified by the district court.258  The dissenters argued that the land trans-
fer statute “was designed specifically to foster the display of the cross.”259  
They opined that transfer of the land into private hands would not end gov-
ernment endorsement of the cross, a plainly religious symbol, because after 
the transfer a reasonable observer would still view the presence of the cross 
as an official endorsement of religion “notwithstanding that the name ha[d] 
changed on the title to a small patch of underlying land.”260  According to 
the dissenters, a reasonable observer would know that the cross was once on 
public land, that the government had been enjoined from displaying the 
cross, that Congress transferred the land and the cross to a private purchaser 
in order to preserve the display, and that the government retained a rever-
sionary interest in the land.261  Moreover, the dissenters claimed that the 
government’s endorsement was ongoing because “the purpose of the trans-
fer [wa]s to preserve [the] display” of the cross.262  Congress, they argued, 
had “singled out that cross for special treatment, and [had] affirmatively 
commanded that the cross must remain.”263       
Unlike the plurality, the dissenters gave little weight to Congress’s 
supposed desire to resolve controversy or avoid offense.  The government, 
they opined, cannot “decline to cure an Establishment Clause violation in 
order to avoid offense.”264  Nor were they inclined to defer to Congress’s in-
stitutional capabilities or considered judgment, especially given that the 
land transfer statute was buried in an appropriations bill and “undertaken 
without any deliberation whatsoever.”265  Finally, the dissenters opined that 
there was no need for the district court to consider less drastic remedies, 
such as the erection of fences and disclaimers at the site.266  None of this 
would change the facts that the land had been “transferred in a manner fa-
voring the cross and [that] the cross would remain designated as a national 
memorial.”267   
 
257  Id. at 1821 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
258  Id. at 1830–31 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
259  Id. at 1831. 
260  Id. at 1832. 
261  Id. at 1833–34. 
262  Id. at 1832–33, 1837–40. 
263  Id. at 1834. 
264  Id. at 1839 n.11. 
265  See id. at 1840. 
266  Id. at 1841. 
267  Id. 
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Owing to the fractured nature of the decision in Buono, it is difficult to 
glean much guidance from it with regard to the constitutionality of settle-
ment-by-disposition.  However, although there are no categorical rules, 
there are strong hints in the plurality opinion that at least three justices are 
inclined to treat property dispositions deferentially, even in a case bearing 
some unusual indicia of favoritism toward a religious symbol.268  Although 
deference to Congress certainly played some role, it is unclear to what ex-
tent the plurality decision rests upon the fact that congressional as opposed 
to local legislation was at issue.  The Buono plurality strongly suggested 
that there may be few, if any, limits on settlement-by-disposition in reli-
gious display cases.        
B. Privatizing Main Street  
Establishment controversies involving public properties are not limited 
to religious displays.  As discussed in Part III, officials increasingly have 
sold public forum properties to private purchasers.269  Religious institutions, 
like any other private actor, are entitled to bid for and purchase public prop-
erties.  Unlike sales to other private actors, though, sales to religious pur-
chasers raise potential Establishment Clause concerns.  When the subject 
property is a traditional public forum, the disposition may be suspect on 
free speech grounds as well.     
In 1999, Salt Lake City, Utah, sold a block-long section of Main Street 
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS).270  The city ini-
tially retained an easement on the property for public access and passage.271  
LDS imposed various speech restrictions on the easement, which were chal-
lenged as violations of the First Amendment’s free speech guarantee.272  Af-
ter the Tenth Circuit held that the easement was a public forum and that 
LDS’s content-based restrictions on speech could not be enforced, the city 
sold the easement to LDS for fair market value.273   
Plaintiffs then challenged the sale of the easement to LDS on both free 
speech and establishment grounds.  The speech claim is discussed in Part III 
below.274  The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court’s dismissal of the estab-
lishment claim.275  As the Supreme Court did in Palmer, the court expressed 
 
268  It is possible that Justices Scalia and Thomas, who concurred in the judgment on the ground that 
the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the land transfer statute, id. at 1824 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., 
concurring), might have voted in favor of the disposition had the issue, in their view, been properly be-
fore the Court.  
269  See infra Part III.C.   
270  Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005).  
271  Id. 
272  Id. at 1253. 
273  Id.; see First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002). 
274  See infra Part III.C.  
275  Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1258–62. 
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“reluctan[ce] to attribute unconstitutional motives” to the city and deferred 
to its characterization of the transaction as bona fide.276  It also concluded 
that there were several secular purposes for the sale.  In addition to receipt 
of fair market value for the land, the court observed that the sale to LDS al-
lowed the city to “extricate itself from perceived entanglement with the 
Church and thereby reduce public outcry by eliminating joint ownership” of 
the property.277  The court also cited resolution of the protracted legal con-
test regarding the property and avoidance of litigation as valid secular pur-
poses supporting the disposition.278   
The transaction did not have the effect of endorsing religion, the court 
said, because it merely allowed LDS “to advance itself” by allowing it to 
purchase the easement parcel.279  The court characterized the sale as “a 
transfer of property from the government to a private entity, which happens 
to be a church.”280  As in the public display cases, plaintiffs challenged the 
sale as a sham transaction intended to endorse LDS’s religious message.281  
The court noted that plaintiffs had not come forward with any evidence 
suggesting that the transaction was a sham; it observed that the city did not 
retain any significant interest in the property and that there was no evidence 
of improper motivation.282   
As in the religious symbol cases, the court concluded that the disposi-
tion of the easement allowed the city to divest itself of any involvement and 
thereby avoid any constitutional difficulties.  The ultimate effect was to 
transfer ownership of an entire portion of the city’s Main Street to a reli-
gious purchaser.  As a result of the title transfer, any speech, association, or 
conduct that does not comport with LDS’s views now may be lawfully sup-
pressed in what was once a traditional public forum.283     
C. Publicization and Religious Symbols  
Privatization is not the only means of property disposition that may be 
used to settle establishment controversies.  Rather than privatize the prop-
erty in question, the government may take possession of both the property 
and any religious symbol on it.  This inverse privatization, or publicization,  
 
276  Id. at 1259 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394–95 (1983)); see Palmer v. Thompson, 
403 U.S. 217, 224–25 (1971). 
277  Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1259. 
278  Id. at 1260. 
279  Id. at 1261. 
280  Id. 
281  Id.  
282  Id. at 1262. 
283  Recently, for example, two men were detained and cited for trespassing after kissing each other 
on the LDS property.  Erin Alberty, Police Report on Men’s Plaza Kiss Released, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
July 17, 2009.  The incident sparked a public protest.  See Ben Fulton, Kissing Protest Brings Cheers, 
Jeers, SALT LAKE TRIB., July 19, 2009.   
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1398 
can be accomplished either by purchase or by the use of eminent domain.284  
Utilizing these processes, governments can embrace rather than attempt to 
distance themselves from the subject properties and symbols.  Thus, along 
with private law mechanisms, officials may use public law principles and 
powers to avoid constitutional claims.  Publicization raises the specter of 
governmental endorsement of religion.  Assuming the post-disposition dis-
play comports with the Establishment Clause, however, publicization may 
represent another means of settlement-by-disposition.   
The protracted controversy over the display of a religious symbol on 
Mt. Soledad in San Diego, California, serves as one example.  A forty-
three-foot-high Latin cross sits atop Mt. Soledad in a public park near San 
Diego, California.285  The Mt. Soledad cross, which is surrounded by more 
than 2000 plaques paying tribute to war veterans, was the center of a dec-
ades-long legal controversy.286  At one point in the cross’s protracted legal 
history, the Ninth Circuit held that the display violated the California Con-
stitution’s prohibition on religious preference.287  The court affirmed an in-
junction forbidding the city from maintaining the cross on public land.288   
In response to the injunction, the city sold approximately 222 square 
feet of land under the cross to the same private association that had erected 
it decades earlier.289  Although the sale was for fair market value, the city 
did not solicit bids or proposals from other prospective purchasers.290  After 
a district court invalidated the sale, in part on the ground that the parcel sold 
was too small to remedy the constitutional violation, the city again sought 
to dispose of the land beneath the cross.291  It expanded the size of the parcel 
to 0.509 acres and solicited bids.292  The bid packages were required to con-
tain, among other things, a detailed proposal for “the maintenance of an his-
toric war memorial.”293  The association’s bid was again accepted.294  
The en banc Ninth Circuit held that the second sale also violated the 
California Constitution.295  The court held that by indicating that the cross 
itself would be conveyed along with the land and that the purchaser could 
satisfy the condition that the site be used as a war memorial by keeping the 
cross in its present location, the city had granted an impermissible “prefer-
 
284  See generally Tebbe, supra note 11 (noting the government’s use of privatization and publiciza-
tion to avoid establishment and free speech claims).  
285  Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1202–03 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
286  Id. at 1203. 
287  See Ellis v. City of La Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993). 
288  Id. at 1520. 
289  Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
290  Id. at 1126. 
291  Id. at 1126–27. 
292  Id. at 1127. 
293  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
294  Id. at 1128. 
295  Id. at 1133. 
104:1361  (2010) Property as/and Constitutional Settlement 
 1399
ence” or benefit to a distinctly religious message in violation of the state 
constitution.296  In essence, the court concluded that purchasers who in-
tended to maintain the cross as part of the war memorial had been given an 
economic advantage, pursuant to the terms of the sale, in comparison to 
those who may have wished to remove the cross.  The latter purchasers, 
said the court, would have been required to absorb the costs of removing 
the cross and constructing an alternative memorial.297  This, then, was a case 
in which unusual circumstances overcame the presumption that the disposi-
tion was valid.   
The court left it to the parties and the lower court to determine an ap-
propriate remedy.298  After further debate and consideration by numerous 
parties—lower courts, San Diego residents (in local referenda), and local 
public officials—failed to resolve the controversy,299 Congress intervened.  
In 2004, Congress passed a resolution recognizing the Mt. Soledad property 
site as a national war memorial and agreeing to accept the property if the 
city chose to donate it to the federal government.300  After efforts to effectu-
ate a donation were blocked by a California trial court,301 in 2006 Congress 
enacted a law taking the property by eminent domain.302   
A federal district court held that neither the taking nor the preservation 
of the Mt. Soledad memorial violated the Establishment Clause.303  Defer-
ring to Congress’s findings and expressing reluctance to impute any illicit 
motive to it, the court held that the purposes of the taking were to preserve a 
war memorial and to settle a protracted local controversy.304  The reasonable 
observer, said the court, would regard Congress’s decision to acquire the 
land as “an effort to preserve an important regional landmark.”305  For simi-
lar reasons, the court held that the continued presence of the monument did 
not violate the Establishment Clause.306   
The disposition of the Mt. Soledad cross suggests that where the gov-
ernment does not own the property upon which a religious symbol sits, it 
may be able to settle constitutional objections by acquiring the property and 
adopting the symbol.  Where federal law is more permissive than local law 
with regard to religious displays or where other means of disposition have 
failed, settlement-by-acquisition may present a viable option.  Whether 
 
296  Id. at 1132–33. 
297  Id.  
298  Id. at 1134. 
299  See Paulson v. Abdelnour, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 575, 580–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (recounting the 
factual and legal history relating to the subject property and the cross). 
300  Act of Dec. 8, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 116(a), (b), 118 Stat. 2809, 3346. 
301  Abdelnour, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 580. 
302  Act of Aug. 14, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-272, § 2, 120 Stat. 770, 770–71. 
303  Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1207–18 (S.D. Cal. 2008). 
304  Id. at 1209–12. 
305  Id. at 1217–18. 
306  Id. at 1218–24. 
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Congress ought to intervene or be invited to participate in local affairs to 
this extent raises interesting issues regarding the scope of federal power.  At 
least insofar as anti-establishment obligations are concerned, however, the 
congressional disposition of the Mt. Soledad cross rescued a symbol the 
city could not protect through either litigation or privatization.  Publicizing 
the subject property and attendant symbols in this manner generally will not 
save an unadorned religious symbol.307  But it might, as the resolution of the 
Mt. Soledad controversy shows, avoid or settle establishment claims in 
some cases.     
Publicization does not require that officials use their eminent domain 
authority.  It may result from a range of transactions, including donations 
and purchases.  Indeed, one of the proposals that preceded the congressional 
taking in the Mt. Soledad contest contemplated that the city would donate 
the property to the federal government.  Like privatization, such disposi-
tions restructure ownership with the apparent goal of removing constitu-
tional concerns.  In some senses, privatization and publicization represent 
very distinct means of settlement.  As Part IV argues, however, both dispo-
sition mechanisms raise serious constitutional concerns.   
III. PROPERTY DISPOSITION AND EXPRESSIVE LIBERTIES 
Freedoms of speech and assembly can also be substantially affected by 
settlement-by-disposition.  During the past several decades, privatization of 
public properties has significantly diminished opportunities for public 
speech and assembly.308  As in other constitutional contexts, dispositions af-
fecting speech and assembly have ranged from leases to outright closures.  
Governments also have turned to taking ownership of private property in 
public fora to settle free speech claims.309  As in the equality and establish-
ment contexts, when First Amendment speech and assembly challenges to 
property dispositions have been brought, public officials have argued that 
the claims have been extinguished or settled by the dispositions.  As in 
other constitutional contexts, officials have resorted to property dispositions  
 
307  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part, dissenting in part) (“I doubt not, for example, that the [Establishment] Clause forbids a city to per-
mit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.”); see also Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009) (“[G]overnment speech must comport with the Establishment 
Clause.”); id. at 1139 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that government speakers are still bound by 
the Establishment Clause). 
308  See generally ZICK, supra note 3, at 2 (discussing the privatization of public streets, sidewalks, 
and other traditional public forum spaces).  For a sociological perspective on privatization, in particular 
the migration to gated communities, see MARGARET KOHN, BRAVE NEW NEIGHBORHOODS: THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC SPACE (2004).  Although the discussion will focus on rights of speech and 
assembly, the right to petition government for grievances is also implicated in some public property dis-
positions. 
309  See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1129–30 (describing the city’s selective adoption of privately do-
nated monuments). 
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in order to settle community disputes, to evade judicial mandates, and on 
rare occasions to purposefully suppress civil liberties.  The Supreme Court 
has offered little guidance regarding the validity of settlement-by-
disposition in speech and assembly contexts.  Lower courts have adopted 
both formal and functional approaches to privatizing dispositions, and the 
implications of the evolving government speech doctrine for public forum 
properties are not yet clear.  In sum, the constitutional and democratic limits 
of settlement-by-disposition are as uncertain in the speech and assembly ar-
eas as elsewhere.     
A. Property Allocation and Public Fora 
In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,310 a plurality of the 
Supreme Court stated that “[w]herever the title of streets and parks may 
rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communi-
cating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”311  The 
Hague dictum is the foundation for contemporary standards regarding ac-
cess to public properties for purposes of speech and assembly.312  Many of 
these standards relate to the regulation of expression, rather than the dispo-
sition of the property itself, and we need not examine them in detail.  How-
ever, four general observations regarding speech and assembly on public 
properties are relevant to the scope of this Article and form the basis for the 
discussion in this Part. 
First, with regard to public properties such as parks, streets, and (most) 
sidewalks,313 the Supreme Court has stated that “the rights of the State to 
limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.”314  This limitation is 
due in substantial measure to Hague’s recognition of the expressive func-
tions and traditions associated with such properties.  In light of these prop-
erties’ importance to public speech and assembly, the government may not 
prohibit all expression in such fora.315  The First Amendment thus requires 
that governments facilitate speech and assembly by making at least some 
spaces—traditional public fora—available for such activities.  Moreover, 
the government may not regulate the content of expression in such places 
absent a compelling justification and a demonstration that the regulation is 
 
310  307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
311  Id. at 515 (emphasis added). 
312  See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
313  Not all sidewalks are created equal insofar as the First Amendment is concerned.  Compare 
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 723, 730 (1990) (holding that a postal sidewalk used primarily 
for access to a post office building is not a public forum), with United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 
(1983) (holding that public sidewalks near the Supreme Court are within the category of properties that 
traditionally have been held open to the public for expressive activities). 
314  Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
315  Id.  
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narrowly drawn to achieve its end.316  It may, however, generally impose 
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.317   
Second, despite these limits, governments retain substantial discretion 
in terms of the operation, maintenance, and perhaps the disposition of pub-
lic fora.  With regard to any forum that traditionally has not been open to 
speech and assembly, but that officials have designated as a forum for such 
activities, the Court has stated that officials are “not required to indefinitely 
retain the open character of the facility.”318  So long as they do so, however, 
officials are required to abide by the standards applicable to traditional pub-
lic fora.319  Some of the Justices have also indicated that traditional public 
forum properties—streets, parks, and sidewalks—may be sold or closed.  In 
a concurrence joined by three Justices in International Society for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, a case involving speech regulations in a public 
airport terminal,320 Justice Kennedy stated that “[i]n some sense the gov-
ernment always retains authority to close a public forum, by selling the 
property, changing its physical character, or changing its principal use.”321  
“Otherwise,” he said, “the State would be prohibited from closing a park, or 
eliminating a street or sidewalk, which no one has understood the public fo-
rum doctrine to require.”322  These statements suggest that the status of even 
a traditional public forum is mutable, either through disposition or substan-
tial physical or functional alteration.  The Court has never expressly decided 
whether and, if so, under what circumstances officials may constitutionally 
dispose of public streets, sidewalks, or parks.   
Third, with regard to mutability, while the government may have the 
authority to sell, close, or alter public fora, it may not simply demote them, 
so to speak, by fiat or legislative pronouncement.323  In United States v. 
Grace, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not by statute designate 
the sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building as nonpublic fora, 
thus permitting officials essentially to ban speech and assembly there.324  
The Court also held that a traditional public forum “will not lose its histori-
cally recognized character for the reason that it abuts government property 
that has been dedicated to a use other than as a forum for public expres-
 
316  Id. 
317  Id.  
318  Id. at 45–46. 
319  Id. at 46. 
320  505 U.S. 672 (1992). 
321  Id. at 699 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
322  Id. at 699–700. 
323  See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981) (“Con-
gress . . . may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the ‘public forum’ status of streets and parks which have 
historically been public forums . . . .”); see also Kevin Francis O’Neill, Privatizing Public Forums to 
Eliminate Dissent, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 201, 207–13 (2007) (discussing various methods by 
which officials have sought to demote public fora).   
324  461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983). 
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sion.”325  As Justice Kennedy indicated in Lee, to change the property’s fo-
rum status, the government must “alter the objective physical character or 
uses of the property, and bear the attendant costs.”326   
Fourth, the Supreme Court has recently recognized that the govern-
ment may itself speak in and perhaps through the public forum.327  It may do 
so directly, by erecting monuments, placards, or other symbols.328  Or it may 
do so by adopting formerly private monuments or symbols as its own, 
through donation or perhaps purchase.329  In the latter type of disposition, 
transferring title to the government essentially allocates public forum prop-
erty based upon the government speech principle.  The Supreme Court has 
held that this type of disposition extinguishes the First Amendment claims 
of other speakers with regard to the public space at issue.330     
The foregoing are the basic ground rules for public forum dispositions.  
Together, they represent the sense in which the government always has au-
thority to dispose of public forum properties.  As we shall see, however, 
application of these basic rules has proven somewhat difficult in certain 
speech and assembly contexts.    
B. Leases of Public Forum Property 
One area of general agreement across doctrinal areas is that merely 
leasing a public property does not settle constitutional claims or concerns.  
Recall that during the civil rights era, courts generally held that the mere 
leasing of public property did not settle Fourteenth Amendment claims.  A 
similar rule applies in the speech and assembly contexts.   
Courts have been skeptical of claims that lease agreements settle 
speech contests involving access to public forum properties.  Several courts 
have held that a private lessee who polices or regulates speech in a place 
that traditionally has functioned as a public street or sidewalk is a state actor 
because he is serving a traditional public function, is involved in a symbi-
otic relationship with a public entity, or both.331       
 
325  Id. 
326  Lee, 505 U.S. at 700 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
327  See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132, 1138 (2009) (holding that the city’s 
adoption of the Ten Commandments and other symbols displayed in a public park extinguished the First 
Amendment claims of a private speaker seeking access to the forum). 
328  Id. at 1132–33. 
329  Id. at 1133–34. 
330  Id. at 1132. 
331  See, e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding that airport ter-
minals leased by private parties from the state were the functional equivalent of public streets to which 
First Amendment rights applied); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Schrader, 461 F. Supp. 714, 
717–18 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that lessees of the Dallas Convention Center, a city-owned facility, 
had to comply with the First Amendment); City of Jamestown v. Beneda, 477 N.W.2d 830, 836 (N.D. 
1991) (holding that sub-lessees of a shopping mall owned by the city had to satisfy First Amendment 
standards for speech regulation on their property); cf. Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 61 
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A good example is Citizens to End Animal Suffering and Exploitation, 
Inc. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., in which a district court held that the 
streets and lanes separating the buildings at Faneuil Hall Marketplace in 
Boston, which had been leased to private merchants for a ninety-nine-year 
term, remained public fora subject to First Amendment protections.332  Prior 
to the lease, the lanes were marked and operated as public streets.333  The 
lessees argued that under the Supreme Court’s state action decisions, the 
lanes at Faneuil Hall Marketplace were private property to which the First 
Amendment did not apply.334  Relying in part on Evans v. Newton (the pub-
lic park devise case discussed in Part I),335 the district court held that in light 
of the public easement encumbering the lanes and the traditional public ac-
cess to them, the lessees were operating the equivalent of a public park or 
policing access to the functional equivalent of a public street.336  The lessees 
were thus serving a traditional and exclusive public function.  The court 
also held that in light of the mutual financial benefits that accrued to the 
parties under the long-term lease, the private lessees had entered a “symbi-
otic relationship” with the city.337  The court went on to hold that the les-
see’s restrictions on public protests at Faneuil Hall Marketplace were 
required to, but did not, satisfy the First Amendment.338        
Faneuil Hall does not necessarily stand for the broad proposition that 
all leased public properties on which speech and assembly might occur are 
automatically subject to the First Amendment.  As in other disposition con-
texts, much depends on the specific characteristics of the property itself and 
the leasing arrangement.339  The subject property in Faneuil Hall was owned 
by the city, had traditionally been used as a forum for speech and assembly, 
was extensively regulated by the city, was indistinguishable from immedi-
ately adjacent public areas, and was subject to a public access easement. 
Where a municipality or other public entity not only retains title to 
what once functioned as a public forum property, but also is involved in 
some mutually beneficial relationship with its private lessees, the First 
Amendment likely will apply to the subject property.  In order to settle or 
avoid First Amendment speech and assembly concerns—or to assure their 
                                                                                                                           
(Colo. 1991) (concluding that private lessees had to comply with the speech guarantees of the state con-
stitution). 
332  745 F. Supp. 65, 67 n.1, 76 (D. Mass. 1990).  
333  Id. at 67 n.1. 
334  Id. at 69 (citing Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment did 
not apply at a private shopping mall)). 
335  See supra notes 27–41 and accompanying text.  
336  Faneuil Hall, 745 F. Supp. at 70–71.  
337  Id. at 73–74. 
338  Id. at 74–76. 
339  See, e.g., Garrison v. City of Lakeland, 954 F. Supp. 246, 250 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that un-
ion demonstrators did not have the First Amendment right to picket on a road leased from the city which 
led to a hospital and functioned primarily as an access road). 
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lessees that there are no such concerns—governments are required to divest 
themselves more fully of any interest in the subject property.   
C. Sales and Substitutions  
Suppose, however, that a municipality sells or otherwise completely 
privatizes a public forum property.  Do these sorts of dispositions settle any 
speech and assembly claims or concerns?  Owing to the trend toward priva-
tization of public forum properties, this has become a critical question.340  
Consistent with the principle stated in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in 
Lee, courts generally have assumed that municipalities always may alter, 
sell, or close even traditional public forum properties.  They have differed, 
however, in the degree of scrutiny they have applied to this particular type 
of settlement-by-disposition.   
Some courts have taken a very formalistic approach to property sales 
and substitutions in speech and assembly contexts.  These courts have held 
that, so long as the instrument of sale or substitution passes title, any consti-
tutional difficulties have been avoided.341  They have not been willing to 
look behind or beyond the terms of deeds and other instruments.  Thus, 
even where the property continues to function as a traditional public forum 
after disposition, some courts have refused to impose First Amendment re-
quirements.  Recall that some courts adopted a similar formalism with re-
spect to certain dispositions in the equal protection context.   
Other courts, perhaps troubled by the apparent breadth of discretion 
granted to officials by the Lee dictum, have imposed some limits on settle-
ment-by-sale.  As discussed below, these courts have applied a more func-
tional standard to post-disposition properties in order to determine whether 
the transaction has in fact settled First Amendment speech and assembly 
concerns.  The functional approach is based on an examination of a variety 
of factors relating to the subject property.  It asks whether, after disposition, 
the property still functions as a traditional public forum.  If so, First 
Amendment requirements continue to apply.  Although the functional ap-
proach has been somewhat effective at constraining officials’ discretion to 
dispose of public forum properties, the approach generally allows officials 
and private purchasers to settle constitutional claims by altering the physi-
cal appearance of the subject properties or making aesthetic adjustments.         
 
340  See ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases ad-
dressing privatization in the First Amendment context); Chi. Acorn v. Metro. Pier & Exposition Auth., 
150 F.3d 695, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting “a nationwide trend toward the privatization of public prop-
erty”). 
341  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Reber, 454 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (C.D. Cal. 
1978) (holding that a portion of a sidewalk previously owned by the city but vacated to a private owner 
was not a public forum, despite the fact that it was “the functional equivalent of a public street”); S.O.C., 
Inc. v. Mirage Casino-Hotel, 23 P.3d 243, 246 (Nev. 2001) (holding that reservation of a public ease-
ment for pedestrian access did not convert private sidewalks into a public forum). 
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Privatization of traditional public forum properties sometimes occurs 
as a result of construction and other municipal projects.  For example, in 
one case the Venetian Casino Resort, which is located on the Las Vegas 
Strip, entered an agreement with the Nevada Department of Transportation 
that allowed it to demolish an existing public sidewalk fronting the ca-
sino.342  Under the agreement, the Venetian was required to construct and 
maintain a private sidewalk connecting the remaining public sidewalks lo-
cated on either side of its property and to dedicate a right-of-way to the De-
partment of Transportation.343  After the sidewalk had been completed, 
county officials issued a permit for a union protest on the sidewalk in front 
of the Venetian.344  The Venetian attempted to have the protesters removed, 
but the District Attorney’s Office declined to issue citations or make ar-
rests.345  The Venetian filed a federal lawsuit against the county, alleging 
that it had taken private property in order to create a public forum.346  The 
casino also sought a declaratory judgment that the replacement sidewalk 
was not a public forum and an injunction requiring that the county recog-
nize and enforce the Venetian’s right to exclude the protesters.347   
The Ninth Circuit held that the replacement sidewalk, which was actu-
ally located on a different parcel than the public sidewalk it had replaced, 
was a public forum to which the union protesters had a right of access under 
the First Amendment (subject, of course, to appropriate time, place, and 
manner regulations).348  In making that determination, the court analyzed 
several factors: the historical use of the public sidewalk that had been re-
placed and its public forum status; the location of the now-private parcel 
and its relationship to the general pedestrian grid; the substitute parcel’s 
character and use after disposition; the sidewalk’s dedication to public use 
for purposes of unobstructed pedestrian access;349 and the lack of any aes-
thetic, environmental, or architectural distinction between the sidewalk in 
front of the Venetian and the connecting public sidewalks.350  The court 
concluded that it was “apparent that the function of the replacement side-
 
342  Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 939–40 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
343  Id. at 940. 
344  Id. 
345  Id. at 940–41. 
346  Id. at 941. 
347  Id.  Although the county defended the suit, it ultimately took no position regarding whether the 
sidewalk was a public forum for First Amendment purposes.  Id. at 941 n.4. 
348  See id. at 942, 948. 
349  A recorded servitude on the parcel provided that the Venetian, its successors, and assigns dedi-
cated the parcel to public use for the purpose of unobstructed pedestrian access.  Id. at 943.  The court 
said that the servitude operated as either a restrictive covenant or an affirmative easement.  Id. at 946.  
However the servitude was characterized, the court concluded that it operated to render the parcel pub-
lic, not private, property.  Id. at 945–46 (“Property that is dedicated to public use is no longer truly pri-
vate.”). 
350  See id. at 943–46.   
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walk on the Venetian’s property was to be the same as the former public 
sidewalk in front of the Venetian and the sidewalks connecting on either 
side of the Venetian property.”351  It emphasized that there was nothing to 
indicate to pedestrians that they were entering a private enclave when they 
used the Venetian’s sidewalk.352   
Despite the fact that the Venetian had legal title to the sidewalk parcel, 
the court held that the sidewalk remained subject to First Amendment re-
quirements.  The fact that the property remained open to the public on es-
sentially the same terms as the public sidewalk it had replaced meant that 
the First Amendment continued to apply even though the Venetian itself 
was a private actor.  The Ninth Circuit did not make clear whether, through 
substantial physical alteration or otherwise, the Venetian could ever change 
the public forum status of its private parcel.  The court seemed to suggest 
that the replacement sidewalk was unique and perhaps immutably public: 
“Even if the Venetian were to close its doors or to be converted into a 
members-only club or some other nonpublic enterprise, members of the 
public would still have the recorded right to pass across the Venetian’s 
property along Las Vegas Boulevard and to express themselves as they do 
so with the same freedom as on any public sidewalk.”353  Two factors 
seemed to be critical to preserving the newly constructed sidewalk as a tra-
ditional public forum.  The first was the unique geography—a replacement 
sidewalk that was sandwiched between two public sidewalks and thus criti-
cal to passage.  The second was the recorded public easement.     
The Tenth Circuit applied a similar functional approach in a pair of 
cases involving the sale of a portion of Main Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS).354  As discussed 
earlier, Salt Lake City closed and sold a portion of the Main Street parcel355 
but initially retained an easement for public access and passage over a por-
tion of the parcel.356  The reservation of easement contained a number of re-
strictions on expressive activity on the parcel and gave LDS the right to 
exclude anyone who engaged in any of the prohibited conduct.357  It also 
contained a right of reverter, which provided that if LDS did not use the 
property for the purpose set forth in the deed, the easement ownership 
would revert to the city.358  LDS made several aesthetic and other changes to 
Main Street Plaza in order to convert it to an ecclesiastical park, including 
 
351  Id. at 942. 
352  See id. at 945. 
353  Id. at 948. 
354  See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2005); First 
Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 2002).   
355  First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1117.   
356  Id. at 1118. 
357  Id. at 1118–19. 
358  Id. at 1119. 
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the addition of “planters, benches, and waterfalls, a large reflecting pool, 
and changes in grade.”359  The district court held that in light of these 
changes in function and appearance, the easement property was no longer a 
public forum.360   
The Tenth Circuit reversed.361  The court began with some general ob-
servations regarding property dispositions and the First Amendment.  The 
court observed that “a deed does not insulate government action from con-
stitutional review”; thus, formal title to the land was not dispositive.362  The 
court also rejected the argument that an easement was not a significant 
enough property interest to merit public forum analysis under the First 
Amendment.363  To the contrary, said the court, some public easements had 
been held to constitute Fifth Amendment takings.364  The court indicated, 
however, that not every easement would constitute a public forum for pur-
poses of the First Amendment.365  That determination would depend on “the 
characteristics of the easement, the practical considerations of applying fo-
rum principles, and the particular context the case presents.”366   
In light of the city’s clear purpose to retain public access to and use of 
the easement parcel, the property’s relationship to the general downtown 
pedestrian transportation grid, and the fact that the easement was open to 
the public, the court concluded that the easement “share[d] many of the 
most important features of sidewalks that are traditional public fora.”367  The 
court further noted that the easement parcel had traditionally been open not 
only to public use but also to expressive activities in particular.368  Further, 
although LDS had made certain physical alterations to the property, the 
court concluded that they were not sufficient to substantially alter the use of 
the property and thus demote the easement parcel from a traditional to a 
nonpublic forum.369  The court said that while the government has the power 
to change the status of even a well-established public forum, it not only 
must alter the physical characteristics of the property but also must bear any 
 
359  Id.  
360  First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1171 (D. Utah 2001), 
rev’d, 308 F.3d 1114. 
361  First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1117. 
362  Id. at 1122 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d (2000) (noting 
that “easements to which government is party are subject to the Constitution”)).  
363  Id. 
364  Id.; see, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (holding that a public easement 
constituted a regulatory taking). 
365  See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1124–25. 
366  Id. at 1123 n.5 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672–77 (1998)). 
367  Id. at 1128. 
368  See id. at 1129–30. 
369  See id. at 1130.  
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attendant costs.370  Here, the city had retained a significant property interest 
after the sale; “[i]n effect, the City want[ed] to have its cake and eat it 
too . . . .”371  According to the Tenth Circuit, the First Amendment does not 
permit this type of arrangement.372  In explaining its decision to apply the 
First Amendment to the privatized easement parcel, the court noted the in-
creasing importance of preserving public spaces open to expressive activi-
ties, particularly in downtown areas.373    
In a sequence of events reminiscent of the Baconsfield saga discussed 
in Part I and the Buono case discussed in Part II, following the Tenth Cir-
cuit’s decision, Salt Lake City sold the easement to LDS in return for just 
over two acres of land in a low-income neighborhood and a $5 million rec-
reation center to be built on the land.374  This time, the settlement agreement 
provided that there was to be no right of public access or passage with re-
gard to Main Street Plaza.375  However, the city did retain a right of re-entry 
that allowed it to reclaim the public easement should LDS fail to maintain 
the plaza it had constructed on the former Main Street as “landscaped 
space.”376   
The Tenth Circuit held that the city now had sufficiently divested itself 
of any interest in the property to avert the transfer of any First Amendment 
speech and assembly obligations to LDS.377  It concluded that LDS was not 
a state actor since it was neither performing a public function by maintain-
ing and determining access to the plaza, now a wholly private property, nor 
involved in any symbiotic relationship with the city.378  Relying on Justice 
Kennedy’s observations in Lee, the court noted that the government always 
retained the options to close a public forum by selling the property or to 
change a property’s status by altering its physical character or uses.379  The 
court held that LDS had made sufficient physical changes to the plaza prop-
erty as a whole to demonstrate that it was privately owned, including post-
ing signs at all entrances to the plaza and erecting planters and other 
barriers.380  Applying the functional approach, the court concluded that the 
plaza’s walkways did not constitute public fora.381  It noted that the primary 
 
370  Id. at 1131 (citing Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 700 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
371  Id. 
372  Id.  The court went on to invalidate the speech restrictions imposed under the easement and the 
reservation.  Id. at 1131–33. 
373  Id. at 1131.  
374  Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 2005). 
375  Id. 
376  Id. 
377  See id. at 1255. 
378  See id.  
379  See id. at 1255–56.  
380  Id.   
381  See id. at 1257–58. 
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purpose of the plaza was to serve as an ecclesiastical park, that there was no 
public servitude that ran with the plaza property, and that the plaza was not 
seamlessly connected to any public sidewalks.382  
Finally, the court discussed the fact that the city had retained a right of 
re-entry requiring that the plaza be maintained as a landscaped space.383  It 
reasoned that this reversionary interest was not a present estate and thus 
was insufficient to render the plaza a public forum.384  The court distin-
guished Hampton and Grubbs,385 which, as discussed in Part I, held that the 
retention of a possibility of reverter was perhaps the most important factor 
in determining whether a disposition settled equality claims.386  The court 
(incorrectly at least as to Hampton) said that these earlier cases had in-
volved close post-disposition relationships between the government and the 
purchasers and that the subject properties served the same primary function 
post-sale as they had pre-sale.387  Since these factors were not present with 
regard to the plaza, the court concluded that Hampton and Grubbs did not 
apply.388 
The property dispositions described above represent only a small frac-
tion of the public space that has been recently privatized.  It is likely that 
most such dispositions have received no First Amendment scrutiny at all.  
On the occasions when private speakers have challenged property disposi-
tions as violating speech and assembly rights, courts increasingly have scru-
tinized the details of the transfer instrument and the character of the post-
disposition property.389  These cases suggest that a carefully crafted disposi-
tion instrument that contains no recorded public easement and prescribes 
modest physical and aesthetic alterations generally will extinguish First 
Amendment speech and assembly claims.  Although some courts have 
noted the precipitous decline in public forum spaces, particularly in urban 
 
382  See id. at 1258.  
383  See id. at 1256–57. 
384  Id. at 1257.  
385  Id. 
386  See supra notes 107–28 and accompanying text. 
387  Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1257.  In Hampton, there was no close relationship between 
the municipality and the purchasers of its golf courses; the court relied almost entirely on the right of 
reverter in finding state action.  See Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1962). 
388  Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1257. 
389  In addition to the cases discussed in the text, see Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of 
Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 494–95 (7th Cir. 2000), reasoning, based on the historical use, the dedication 
of the property to public use, and the physical location of the property, that the parcel was a public fo-
rum for First Amendment purposes, and Gerritsen v. City of Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 
1993), rejecting the city’s argument that a portion of a public park was “semi-private.”  However, con-
sider Hawkins v. City of Denver, 170 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999), holding that a pedestrian walk-
way in a city galleria, located on the site of a former public street, had been converted to a nonpublic 
forum.   
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areas, they have thus far been able to do relatively little to reverse the de-
cline.390   
D. Closure and Vacation of Public Access 
 Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lee suggested that officials had the dis-
cretion to close public forum properties.391  Rather than selling or physically 
altering public forum property, officials might simply vacate any rights of 
public access or destroy the subject property, thereby effectively closing it 
to public access.  What, if any, limits do the First Amendment’s speech and 
assembly clauses impose on this type of disposition?392 
The Supreme Court has never addressed a public forum closure.  At 
least insofar as they are represented in reported cases, outright closures of 
public forum properties appear to be rare.  One example is Thomason v. 
Jernigan, where local officials vacated a public right-of-way to a cul-de-sac 
in front of an abortion clinic.393  The clinic had been the target of several 
public protests, and the city claimed that it had difficulty controlling crowds 
and traffic in and around the cul-de-sac.394  It did not appear, however, that 
the local police had attempted to enforce existing traffic or other local 
laws.395  The record, which included testimony at the public hearing on the 
property vacation, showed that the disposition was directly linked to the 
demonstrations.396  The court observed that the vacation had essentially 
converted a traditional public forum that had been used for protest activity 
into private property.397  The question, according to the court, was “whether 
that action constitutes the impermissible destruction of a public forum,” 
subject to First Amendment review.398    
Relying on Grace and other public forum cases, the court appeared to 
adopt a presumption that any property disposition that destroys a traditional 
 
390  See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 791 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If this trend 
of privatization continues—and we have no reason to doubt that it will—citizens will find it increasingly 
difficult to exercise their First Amendment rights to free speech, as the fora where expressive activities 
are protected dwindle.”). 
391  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
392  This concern extends to contexts other than the traditional public forum.  See, e.g., Rhames v. 
City of Biddeford, 204 F. Supp. 2d 45, 50–53 (D. Me. 2002) (concluding that the temporary closure of a 
public access television channel did not violate the First Amendment, but declining to decide whether 
permanent closure might do so). 
393  770 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (E.D. Mich. 1991).  The city retained only an easement for utilities.  Id. 
394  Id. at 1197–98. 
395  See id. at 1203.  
396  See id. at 1198–99 (describing municipal reports that had identified the protests as the impetus 
for the city’s decision to vacate the right-of-way). 
397  Id. at 1200. 
398  Id. 
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public forum violates the First Amendment.399  It ultimately held that the 
vacation was an impermissible content-based disposition and, in the alterna-
tive, that even if it was deemed a content-neutral disposition, the city had 
failed to satisfy the requirement that it be narrowly tailored.400  Although the 
court acknowledged that precedents such as Palmer rendered the city’s sub-
jective “motives” largely, if not wholly, irrelevant, it repeatedly referred to 
evidence of the city’s intent or purpose to suppress the clinic protesters’ 
speech.401  Ultimately, however, the court said that the case turned on the ef-
fect of the property disposition.402  It concluded that despite the city’s prof-
fer of content-neutral justifications and despite the fact that no member of 
the public henceforth would have access to the cul-de-sac, the vacation of 
the public right-of-way effectively discriminated against a particular group 
of protesters in violation of the First Amendment.403             
Thomason bears more than a passing resemblance to Palmer, which 
upheld the closure of the public pools after an integration decree had been 
entered.404  In contrast to Palmer, however, Thomason refused to defer to 
the explanations proffered by local officials for their decision to vacate.  In-
deed, as noted, the court appeared to apply a presumption against the dispo-
sition of traditional public forum properties.  The result in Thomason was 
colored by the city’s rather obvious content discrimination.  Insofar as it 
stands merely for the proposition that the government cannot close or va-
cate public access to a public forum for content-discriminatory reasons, 
Thomason breaks no new ground.  If, however, Thomason’s apparent pre-
sumption were to apply even to dispositions effected for content-neutral 
reasons, it would substantially qualify the proposition that “[i]n some sense 
the government always retains authority to close a public forum.”405    
E. Government Ownership and Government Speech   
Some free speech claims can also be settled or extinguished through 
publicization of property rather than privatization or closure.  Publicization 
is a different kind of public-space-allocating disposition.  It entails not the 
disposition of the underlying property, which is already owned or held in 
trust by the government, but rather the adoption or purchase of private 
 
399  See id. at 1202 (“The vacation of an easement that transforms a public street and sidewalk into 
private property is almost prima facie evidence that the City’s action was not narrowly drawn.”).   
400  See id. at 1201–03. 
401  See id. at 1201 (finding that while the city “claim[ed] that it vacated the cul-de-sac solely to 
regulate conduct and control traffic problems[,] . . . the record clearly show[ed] that the conduct and 
traffic problems to be regulated [we]re the plaintiffs’ protest activities”). 
402  See id. at 1200 (acknowledging that, under Palmer, “the Court should not engage in a search for 
the motives of legislators, but for an inevitable unconstitutional effect resulting from their actions”). 
403  See id. at 1201.  
404  See discussion supra notes 137–60 and accompanying text. 
405  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).   
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speech by the government.  The adoption or purchase of the speech in ques-
tion purportedly settles any competing access claims by other private 
speakers.   
This was the means of settlement at issue in Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum.406  Summum held that a city was not required, under the Free 
Speech Clause, to accept a private religious monument for permanent dis-
play in a public park where a city-owned Ten Commandments monument 
(along with other displays) was already located.407  The Court reasoned that 
the public monuments already on display in the park, which had been do-
nated to the city by private parties, were a form of government speech and 
thus were not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.408  The 
means of transfer in Summum was somewhat similar to the taking described 
earlier in the establishment context.409  In this case, the transfer of owner-
ship of the Ten Commandments monument from a private party to the city 
was held to extinguish any free speech claims.410  The transformation of pri-
vate speech into government speech effectively displaced the public forum 
doctrine.411 
Summum is disconcerting in part because it suggests the possibility that 
the government speech principle might be used to effect an end-run around 
the Establishment Clause.  But Summum raises serious free speech concerns 
as well.  Summum treats the public square as an instrument of governmental 
speech, a location that exists to facilitate the government’s own mes-
sages.412  The notion that the public forum exists to convey governmental 
messages appears to turn the justification for the public forum—facilitation 
of the public’s speech and assembly—on its head.  Summum makes clear 
that governments are permitted to commandeer portions of the public 
square for their own permanent displays, to choose which displays (includ-
ing perhaps religious ones) they will present to the public, and to insist on 
exclusive speech rights in some locations.413  Although a government 
 
406  129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009). 
407  Id. at 1129. 
408  See id. at 1134. 
409  See supra notes 285–306 and accompanying text. 
410  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1132. 
411  See id. at 1133.  This is yet another context in which public forum principles have been deemed 
inapposite in situations where speakers seek access to publicly controlled facilities.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003) (holding that public forum principles were 
out of place in a public library context).   
412  See Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1133 (“Public parks are often closely identified in the public mind 
with the government unit that owns the land.”); id. at 1134 (observing that public parks “play an impor-
tant role in defining the identity that a city projects to its own residents and to the outside world”). 
413  This is not to suggest that the specific holding in Summum was wrong.  After all, it would be im-
practical indeed to permit a permanent monument free-for-all in public parks and plazas.  But we ought 
to recognize that, depending on the development of the government speech principle going forward, set-
tlement-by-adoption (of speech), like settlement-by-disposition more generally, may substantially con-
strain public speech rights in the public square. 
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speech disposition does not necessarily settle establishment claims, it extin-
guishes all competing claims to access under the Free Speech Clause.414  
After Summum, officials possess an additional mechanism for settle-
ment-by-disposition.  Summum’s impact on public forum properties and 
public speech rights is not yet known.  At this point, however, it is at least 
clear that publicizing private monuments and perhaps other property will al-
ter the allocation of free speech rights in some public forum spaces.   
IV. SETTLEMENT-BY-DISPOSITION AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 
As we have seen across a range of historical and doctrinal contexts, 
dispositions of certain public properties have a significant effect on consti-
tutional liberties.  Since the civil rights era, courts and public officials have 
tended to view most of these dispositions through the lens of private prop-
erty law, with governments acting as ordinary sellers or purchasers.  This 
private law framework has generally obscured the public obligations offi-
cials owe when disposing of certain public properties.  Governments are 
not, of course, ordinary property owners or purchasers.  Critical constitu-
tional assets should not be alienated or purchased solely to favor specific 
viewpoints, symbols, or sellers.  Courts and public officials ought to focus 
more directly on the public constitutional obligations that attach to certain 
properties subject to disposition.   
In an effort to move us away from the private law mindset and to bring 
greater coherence to considerations of settlement-by-disposition across doc-
trinal areas, this Part relies by analogy on the public trust doctrine.415  It ar-
gues that governments hold certain public properties in trust for the benefit 
of the public.  Under the proposed public trust model, in order to constitu-
tionally dispose of certain public properties officials would have to comply 
with trusteeship duties that I will label fair dealing, preservation, and com-
pliance with constitutional covenants.  Although courts have not used these 
specific labels, those that have placed some limits on settlement-by-
disposition have invoked similar ideas.  However, as we have seen, judicial 
review of settlement-by-disposition has not been uniformly protective of 
public trust interests.  Thinking in terms of public trust duties may help 
courts and officials work through the constitutional implications of settle-
ment-by-disposition.  Ultimately, the goal is for public officials to act as re-
 
414  Summum, 129 S. Ct. at 1137.   
415  As will become apparent, the analogy is loose.  I do not contend that the public properties under 
consideration here should be governed by the public trust doctrine that has been applied to natural re-
sources.  See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (concluding that states hold title 
to submerged lands in trust for the benefit of the people); see generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (dis-
cussing the origins and operation of public trust doctrine).  Nevertheless, the public trust analogy pro-
vides a useful framework for conceptualizing and articulating some proposed limits to settlement-by-
disposition.    
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sponsible stewards of public properties that they hold in trust for the benefit 
of the people and to enter into constitutional settlements.    
A. (Discretionary) Property Allocations and (Mandatory) Constitutional 
Rights 
As the description and analysis of settlement-by-disposition shows, no 
bright-line rule can resolve the fundamental conflict between the govern-
mental power to dispose of (i.e., sell or purchase) public properties and the 
constitutional liberties that cannot exist without access to them.  As the civil 
rights era first demonstrated, settlement-by-disposition raises a fundamental 
conflict between what is generally viewed as discretionary power to allocate 
and dispose of public properties and the seemingly mandatory nature of 
constitutional rights.  As Parts II and III showed, this fundamental tension 
has resurfaced in contemporary First Amendment contexts.  It has mainly 
arisen as a result of privatization of public properties.  But as we have seen, 
public purchasing and taking powers also have raised questions regarding 
the legitimacy of settlement-by-disposition.   
To hold that government can never dispose of public properties that are 
either critically important to constitutional liberties or at the center of an 
ongoing constitutional controversy would deprive officials of an aspect of 
their traditional authority.  Further, as Justices Burger and Blackmun noted 
in their Palmer concurrences, such a limitation would require that in some 
cases government must maintain public parks, pools, schools, and other 
properties in perpetuity.  The Constitution has never been interpreted to im-
pose this sort of broad restraint on governmental disposition of public prop-
erties.  Indeed, since the New Deal, economic decisions of this sort 
generally have been reviewed under a mere rationality standard.416  More-
over, in the public forum context, with the possible exception of the re-
quirement that presently existing public streets and parks must be open to 
some speech and assembly, the Constitution has not been interpreted to 
make property distributions either mandatory or impermissible.417  Un-
doubtedly, governments also have the general constitutional power to take 
or purchase properties.418  In sum, public properties are generally considered 
alienable and governments have the authority to add properties to their port-
folios.      
Governments also have a distinct and substantial interest in pursuing 
and achieving constitutional settlements.  This interest includes avoidance 
 
416  See Louis Michael Seidman, The Dale Problem: Property and Speech Under the Regulatory 
State, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1541, 1544–48 (2008) (describing the “New Deal compromise,” pursuant to 
which enactments affecting economic liberties have generally been subjected to rationality review while 
measures affecting noneconomic liberties such as free speech have been subjected to heightened judicial 
scrutiny). 
417  See id. at 1592–94 (discussing the allocation of forum properties).   
418  See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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of litigation and its attendant costs.  Legislative and executive officials, like 
their judicial counterparts, must be permitted to avoid constitutional issues 
where possible.  Bona fide sales and other legitimate property dispositions 
may serve this valuable settlement function.   
By the same token, a rule of automatic or presumptive validity for 
property dispositions would be unworkable and, frankly, unwise.  As the 
civil rights era disposition cases demonstrated, to hold that the mere fact of 
disposition immediately and henceforth settles any constitutional claims 
would be to treat certain constitutional liberties—in particular those inti-
mately connected to the subject properties—as wholly discretionary.419  As 
Palmer starkly demonstrated, holding that the mere fact of disposition im-
mediately extinguishes any constitutional concerns would grant govern-
ments the authority to turn the Constitution on or off at will.420  Indeed, this 
is one of the enduring lessons of the civil rights era experience with settle-
ment-by-disposition.   
While governments may not have any constitutional obligation to pro-
vide schools, streets, and parks in the first place, once they do so, they must 
manage and dispose of such properties in a manner that complies with con-
stitutional obligations and respects constitutional guarantees.  Although the 
point has sometimes been obscured or misunderstood by courts and public 
officials, the dispositions themselves are state actions subject to constitu-
tional limitations.  Moreover, dispositions such as public purchases or tak-
ings are also subject to constitutional limitations.  The purchase itself may 
be constitutionally or legislatively authorized, but it also must comply with 
the Bill of Rights and other constitutional guarantees.  Disposition settles 
title; it does not, standing alone, settle all constitutional concerns.         
B. The Public Trust Model 
We need a framework and mechanism for conceptualizing and impos-
ing some limits on settlement-by-disposition.  The key is to prevent public 
officials from treating public properties as mere disposable assets.  Courts 
have not failed entirely to recognize the dangers inherent in settlement-by-
disposition.  We can see this in some civil rights cases rejecting what 
seemed to be bona fide sales and in the functional approaches some courts 
have adopted in the establishment and speech contexts.  But since the civil 
rights era, judicial efforts have tended to be ad hoc, reactionary, and uneven 
in terms of protecting public access and preserving public spaces.  Abney 
and Palmer long ago demonstrated the limits of judicial review with regard 
to settlement-by-disposition.  The plurality opinion in Buono shows that 
 
419  See Seidman, supra note 416, at 1566 (“When property rights are discretionary, free speech 
rights tend to become discretionary as well.”).  
420  See discussion supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text; cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 
723, 765 (2008) (observing that the federal government does not have “the power to switch the Constitu-
tion on or off at will” by manipulating territory).   
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courts are still inclined to apply a private law approach that presumes that 
governments, like private property owners, may generally dispose of prop-
erties notwithstanding public constitutional obligations.421      
Restraints on alienation with respect to common resources are some-
times imposed under the public trust doctrine.422  Public officials and courts 
might benefit from conceptualizing public properties that are critical to the 
exercise of constitutional liberties as critical assets held in trust by govern-
ments and thus subject to limited alienability.  Under this proposed frame-
work, in order to constitutionally dispose of these properties officials would 
have to comply with the proposed duties of fair dealing, preservation of the 
public trust, and compliance with constitutional covenants.  Ultimately, 
public officials would have an obligation with regard to the subject proper-
ties to enter constitutional settlements that serve public purposes rather than 
private interests, comply with judicial decrees, and respect minority rights.  
These trust obligations, which are drawn and synthesized from the collec-
tive experience with settlement-by-disposition since the civil rights era, 
would apply whether the purported settlement takes the form of privatiza-
tion or represents a more public law settlement such as a taking.  They 
would also apply affirmatively—that is, whether or not courts are asked or 
even able to enforce them.  Collectively, the trust duties and obligations 
discussed below would qualify and limit the sense in which governments 
“in some sense always” retain the authority to dispose of public proper-
ties.423  
1. The Nexus Test and the Trust Corpus.—A question immediately 
arises regarding which properties constitute the trust corpus.  On the one 
hand, limits on alienability should not be so broad as to cripple governmen-
tal power to dispose of properties and facilities.  On the other hand, critical 
constitutional properties and public rights of use and enjoyment with regard 
to those properties ought to be preserved.  
Public property is not, of course, a generic category.  Not all property 
dispositions implicate substantial constitutional and democratic concerns.  
For example, dispositions of surplus properties such as abandoned munici-
pal lots or waste facilities raise no special constitutional concerns.  Such 
properties are not intricately connected to the exercise of constitutional lib-
erties.   
By contrast, public properties that are critical to the exercise of consti-
tutional liberties ought to be considered part of the trust corpus.  Insofar as 
the subject properties are public streets, sidewalks, and parks, the case for 
inclusion in the public trust corpus has substantial precedential support.  
 
421  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817–18 (2010) (urging deference to the legislative judgment that 
the property be sold in order to settle the establishment controversy). 
422  See, e.g., Sax, supra note 415. 
423  See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).   
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The origins of the public forum doctrine lie in dictum from Hague v. Com-
mittee for Industrial Organization, which explicitly invokes the concept of 
the public trust: “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of 
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts 
between citizens, and discussing public questions.”424  All members of the 
community are entitled to enjoy this portion of the trust corpus on equal 
terms, not as special beneficiaries of governmental privatization or publici-
zation.425  
The public forum trust is far too narrow to encompass all of the proper-
ties and resources in the proposed trust corpus.  For example, it would not 
have included many of the properties, such as public schools, restaurants, 
and swimming pools, used for settlement-by-disposition during the civil 
rights era.  Nor would it include certain public parklands, such as the parcel 
at issue in Salazar v. Buono, that have not traditionally been used for ex-
pressive purposes.  Moreover,  it is not entirely clear that the public forum 
trust requires any sort of preservation of trust resources.  At most, it seems 
to require that, in certain existing public places, the government make some 
opportunities for speech and assembly available.  The public forum trust 
thus provides only limited support for the public trust model I am propos-
ing.   
The trust corpus must be somewhat broader than the traditional public 
forum category.  The general public trust doctrine has been interpreted to 
limit the government’s ability to dispose of a variety of critical public re-
sources including coastal and other public lands.426  These resources are 
shared in common by the public and are often scarce.  A broader notion of 
trust resources as constitutional assets should apply in considerations of set-
tlement-by-disposition.  Since the civil rights era, the properties that have 
been disposed of in order to settle constitutional claims and concerns have 
been scarce constitutional resources.  Integrated or soon-to-be-integrated 
facilities, public parklands, streets, and sidewalks all ought to be considered 
common but scarce public resources subject to certain limits on alienability.  
Disposition of these properties substantially affects the public’s rights to 
 
424  307 U.S. 496, 515 (1937) (emphasis added). 
425  Although reliance on streets and parks for expression has declined, these properties remain criti-
cally important to public contention, self-government, and self-actualization.  See ZICK, supra note 3 
(arguing that public places such as streets and parks remain important as fora for the exercise of First 
Amendment liberties, despite a modern reliance on other expressive outlets).  As Justice Kennedy has 
emphasized, privatization in particular poses a grave threat to the public square and to public expression.  
See Lee, 505 U.S. at 695–700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining the need to preserve public proper-
ties for speech and assembly).  
426  Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:  
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 640–41 (1986); see also id. at 649–50 
(noting that public trust doctrine has been applied to rural parklands and downtown areas). 
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access, use, and enjoy common resources that are critically linked to vari-
ous constitutional liberties.    
Similarly, properties that are taken or purchased by governments may 
become part of or alter the existing trust corpus.  The Mt. Soledad taking 
and the purchase of private speech in Summum are examples.427  Again, the 
purchase or taking itself may be legally authorized.  Nevertheless, as ex-
plained in the remainder of this section, certain pre- and post-disposition 
duties may apply to properties that are held in common for the benefit of 
the public.  To be sure, there are some built-in limits on governmental prop-
erty acquisitions.  For example, the government’s power to take private 
property is restricted by the Due Process Clause and the Takings Clause.428  
But minimal requirements of due process and the liability rule requiring 
payment of just compensation may not be adequate public safeguards.  
These limitations do not necessarily prevent collusive and sham disposi-
tions.  Further, while they provide some protection to property owners, due 
process and eminent domain limits may fail to protect both the rights of mi-
nority objectors and the public at large from the effects of property disposi-
tions.  In sum, it is appropriate to consider certain acquired parcels as part 
of the trust corpus and thus subject to the proposed trust duties.   
Limiting the government’s power to dispose of certain public proper-
ties will not entail invasive judicial or other inroads on generally discretion-
ary allocative authority.  In many cases, compliance with the basic 
procedures applicable to disposition of public properties will satisfy any le-
gal and constitutional requirements.  With respect to critical constitutional 
assets, however, additional duties ought to apply. 
2. The Duty of Fair Dealing.—Under the proposed public trust ap-
proach, the most basic of the proposed public trust duties is the duty to en-
gage in fair dealing with regard to the subject property.  At a minimum, of 
course, any disposition must have a legitimate public purpose.  However, 
contrary to the formalist approach taken by some courts, this means more 
than compliance with federal, state, and local laws relating to property dis-
position.  The mere passage of legal title does not satisfy the proposed duty 
of fair dealing.  The disposition must be executed for a legitimate and non-
discriminatory purpose.   
Although courts did not use these terms, one could regard the history 
of settlement-by-disposition during the civil rights era as indicating an ef-
fort by some courts to impose such a duty.  State and local officials fre-
quently disposed of the trust corpus in a manner that breached what I call 
the duty of fair dealing through various attempts to evade equality guaran-
tees.  As discussed in Part I, during the 1950s and 1960s some courts be-
came acutely aware that seemingly innocuous and routine property 
 
427  See supra notes 285–306, 406–13 and accompanying text. 
428  U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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dispositions were not as they seemed on the surface.  Over time, the courts 
received an invaluable education regarding the various forms and tactics 
used to achieve circumvention-by-disposition.  As judges gained experi-
ence, some became highly skeptical of the legitimacy of property disposi-
tion as a means of settling Fourteenth Amendment concerns.  Judge 
Wisdom voiced this judicial frustration when he stated that “in the sector of 
the law encompassed in the subject ‘Civil Rights’, case by case federal 
courts have acquired a thorough education in ‘Sophisticated Circumven-
tion.’”429   
As discussed in Part I, however, there were limits to this judicial skep-
ticism.  Not all courts were willing to look behind or second-guess property 
dispositions.  Even the Supreme Court, the very source of Brown’s national 
integration directive, upheld some very questionable dispositions.  Al-
though seemingly disheartened by the result, the Abney Court upheld the 
city’s divestment and permitted Baconsfield to revert to Senator Bacon’s 
heirs, even though that meant the closure of the park rather than its integra-
tion.430  In Palmer, the Court ultimately deferred to local officials’ economic 
and “public safety” justifications in allowing the closure of the city’s public 
pools, even though the effect was circumvention of a pending integration 
order.431  Still, in many cases, especially those involving the integration of 
schools, lower courts often prevented circumvention-by-disposition by in-
sisting on fair dealing and a measure of public accountability.432   
Public officials have continued to dispose of the trust corpus in ways 
that suggest circumvention of rather than compliance with constitutional 
guarantees.  Yet in many cases contemporary property dispositions have not 
been viewed with serious skepticism.  Today a duty of fair dealing, insofar 
as it applies in some form, appears to be satisfied so long as no “unusual 
circumstances”433 are present.  As the Buono plurality opinion suggested,  
courts are still reluctant to look behind property dispositions.434  In some 
cases, so long as the dispositions have satisfied private law requirements for 
land transfers, they have been deemed valid.435  Indeed, as Buono suggests, 
 
429  United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 5 (1963). 
430  See supra notes 42–57 and accompanying text. 
431  See supra notes 137–44 and accompanying text. 
432  See supra notes 64–76, 80–103 and accompanying text. 
433  See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 
2000). 
434  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1817–18 (2010) (noting that the land-transfer enactment “em-
bodie[d] Congress’s legislative judgment that this dispute is best resolved through a framework and pol-
icy of accommodation” and that the district court should not have dismissed that judgment lightly).  
435  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 341. 
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there appears to be a working presumption of fair dealing on the part of 
public officials.436   
Civil rights era courts were of course reacting to more than two dec-
ades of attempted nullification and circumvention-by-disposition.  Nothing 
we have seen in the First Amendment or any other context quite compares 
with this attempted violation of the public trust.  Nevertheless, the funda-
mental reasons for skepticism, including the possibility of circumvention 
and government manipulation of the trust corpus, certainly remain present 
today.437   
Thus, at a minimum, a “bona fide” property disposition is generally 
one that complies with all applicable land disposition laws, involves the fair 
solicitation of bids from the public, and is effectuated for fair market value 
or just compensation.  Dispositions must be bona fide in the most elemen-
tary sense that the process of disposition is lawful and legitimate.  However, 
this basic legal formality is merely a minimum requirement, not the full ex-
tent of the proposed duty of fair dealing.        
Courts ought to scrutinize more carefully the underlying basis for gov-
ernmental action when public trust values are at stake.  In particular, they 
ought to ensure that the disposition is being executed for a valid public pur-
pose.  Although courts have not always treated them as such, we have en-
countered a host of indicators in disposition cases that might suggest a 
breach of the duty of fair dealing.  For example, dispositions executed just 
prior to or in response to judicial orders requiring integration or removal of 
a public religious display may suggest an improper purpose.  Where the ex-
tensive history relating to a disposition suggests a collusive effort to pre-
serve a religious symbol, there is a basis for requiring a very clear secular 
justification for it.  Similarly, where a disposition preserves access for only 
a select few speakers it might be considered presumptively violative of the 
duty of fair dealing.  Even the deferential standard applied in ordinary tak-
ings cases arguably ought to be ratcheted up where a government intervenes 
for the specific purpose, or with the ultimate effect, of rescuing or preserv-
ing a purely sectarian symbol.  Although the foregoing circumstances 
would not necessarily require rescission of the transaction, they would cer-
tainly justify further judicial inquiry. 
Some might object that the proposed duty of fair dealing would em-
broil courts in difficult questions of governmental purpose and motive.  
They might suggest that courts ought to limit review solely to the disposi-
tion instruments and other objective facts.  Purpose or motive review indeed 
 
436  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (criticizing the district court for failing to ac-
knowledge that “Congress’s prerogative to balance opposing interests and its institutional competence to 
do so provide one of the principal reasons for deference to its policy determinations”).  
437  See, e.g., id. at 1837 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the purpose of the land transfer statute 
was to preserve the cross, a religious symbol, on privatized land). 
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has long been controversial.438  However, a few examples will demonstrate 
why such an inquiry is sometimes necessary to determine whether officials 
have complied with the duty of fair dealing.   
Suppose, for example, that a state legislature, having been ordered by a 
court to remove a Latin cross from its capitol, enters an agreement to sell 
the small portion of the capitol building upon which the cross presently sits 
to a private party.  The legislature stands ready to erect a plaque indicating 
that the cross is privately owned and does not constitute an endorsement of 
any religion or religious message by the state.  Assume further that the sale 
complies with state laws and is the product of an open and fair bidding 
process.  Although the transaction appears to be legally bona fide, there is 
ample reason in such a case to suspect that the object of this transaction, as 
well as its effect, is to preserve and endorse a religious message in a critical 
democratic space.439   
Similarly, recall the vacation of public access to the cul-de-sac in front 
of the abortion clinic in Thomason.440  There was no indication in that case 
that local regulations relating to land disposition had not been followed to 
the letter.  Surely, though, that does not mean the judicial inquiry ought to 
be at an end.  As it turned out, officials had not in fact dealt fairly with the 
cul-de-sac property.  They had vacated the public’s right of access precisely 
because protesters had used the property for protected First Amendment ac-
 
438  See Ely, supra note 145, at 1208 (“Opening skirmishes over the relevance of motivation oc-
curred during the 1920’s and early 1930’s in cases involving the reach of federal power.”).  John Hart 
Ely and Paul Brest had a comprehensive debate concerning whether official motive or purpose was rele-
vant to legislative, executive, and administrative decisions, and if so under what circumstances.  See 
Brest, supra note 145; Ely, supra note 144, at 1208.  In situations involving generally discretionary gov-
ernmental decisionmaking, including disposition of governmental resources like public properties, Ely 
argued that illicit motive may require the government to present a legitimate defense of the choice made, 
while Brest argued that illicit motive was sufficient grounds for invalidation.  Compare Ely, supra note 
145, at 1295 (arguing that “[o]rdinarily a state need provide no legitimate defense of a decision to termi-
nate one public service rather than another, but when the choice has been made for an unconstitutional 
reason, such a defense should be required”), with Brest, supra note 145, at 130–31 (arguing that courts 
should invalidate otherwise constitutional decisions when they are designed in part to serve an illicit or 
suspect motive, “unless the defendant comes forward with an extraordinary justification”).  Enlightening 
as it was, neither that debate, nor any since, has settled the matter.  The problems with motive review, 
including the difficulty of ascertaining motive and the futility of invalidating otherwise permissible laws 
or actions on motive grounds, were apparent well before Palmer held that official motive, standing 
alone, could not determine the constitutionality of the pool closures.  See Brest, supra note 145, at 119–
30 (discussing purported difficulties with motive review).  Despite Palmer’s admonition, motive review 
remains present even in contemporary equality contexts.  See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 
(1990) (holding that in challenging a voting district on equal protection grounds, the plaintiff had to 
show that race was the “predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant 
number of voters within or without a particular district”). 
439  Cf. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 766 (1995) (plurality opin-
ion) (acknowledging that government is not acting neutrally when it “giv[es] sectarian religious speech 
preferential access to a forum close to the seat of government (or anywhere else for that matter)”). 
440  Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195, 1196 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
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tivities.441  A narrow focus on the procedural validity of these dispositions—
i.e., whether they complied with local land use laws and regulations—
would have been wholly inadequate.      
Concerns about undertaking motive or purpose inquiries in establish-
ment cases ought not be overstated, particularly since Establishment Clause 
doctrine expressly requires that courts assess official purpose.442  While 
purpose review has not resulted in the invalidation of a great many enact-
ments or governmental actions, Supreme Court precedents, particularly re-
cent ones, provide ample support for undertaking the inquiry with an eye 
toward smoking out sham explanations, transactions, and policies.443  Al-
though the government’s characterization of a disposition as a bona fide set-
tlement is entitled to some deference, courts ultimately have a duty to 
“distinguish[] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.”444    
It is thus appropriate, “where an understanding of official objective 
emerges from readily discoverable fact, without any judicial psychoanalysis 
of [an official’s] heart of hearts,” to undertake an objective inquiry regard-
ing the purpose of a sale or other disposition of public property.445  The dis-
coverable and objective facts in disposition cases may include the retention 
of a property interest by the government, continued official involvement in 
the maintenance of the property after disposition, the structuring of the 
transaction such that the continued display of a religious symbol is favored, 
and any history of governmental efforts to ensure that a religious display is 
preserved in its original state.  The fact that all of these elements were pre-
sent446 ought to weigh very heavily in the district court’s reconsideration of 
the constitutionality of the transfer statute in Buono.   
In sum, in assessing whether the government has complied with the 
duty of fair dealing in Establishment Clause cases, courts ought not confine 
the inquiry to the facial validity of the disposition instruments.  To echo 
Judge Wisdom’s observation with regard to civil rights circumvention, the 
skepticism evident in some recent Supreme Court Establishment Clause 
 
441  See id. at 1201–03. 
442  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (requiring that legislation have a secular 
purpose).  
443  See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (holding that a display of the Ten 
Commandments at a county courthouse had a “predominately religious purpose” and thus violated the 
Establishment Clause); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (holding that it was 
reasonable to infer that the school district’s stated purpose for allowing student-initiated prayer at foot-
ball games was a sham); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 589 (1987) (holding that Louisiana’s   
“Creationism Act” violated the Establishment Clause because it did not fulfill its stated secular purpose 
of protecting academic freedom).  
444  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).    
445  McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 862.  
446  See Buono, 130 S. Ct 1803, 1813 (2010) (describing the sequence of statutes Congress passed in 
order to preserve the cross memorial on privatized land). 
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cases stems from courts’ having received, if not “a thorough education in 
‘Sophisticated Circumvention,’”447 at least an introductory course or two.   
The duty of fair dealing also limits dispositions of public forum proper-
ties such as public sidewalks, streets, and parks.  Commentators generally 
have agreed with the proposition, stated in Justice Kennedy’s Lee concur-
rence, that “[i]n some sense the government always retains authority to 
close a public forum, by selling the property, changing its physical charac-
ter, or changing its principal use.”448  That authority is not unbridled, how-
ever.  For example, Thomason demonstrates that the duty of fair dealing 
ought to incorporate the First Amendment prohibition on content discrimi-
nation,449 as well as the principle that even a content-neutral disposition may 
fail to serve an important governmental purpose.450  Where the objective 
facts indicate some reason to doubt that the disposition has been effected in 
good faith and for a proper public purpose, courts ought to carefully scruti-
nize the government’s explanation for the transfer.       
Ultimately, the duty of fair dealing has both procedural and substantive 
components.  It is necessary but not sufficient that the sale or conveyance 
meets the minimum procedural standards for legal dispositions.  The dispo-
sition also must have been effectuated for a proper public purpose.  Because 
the properties in question are constitutional assets, the duty of fair dealing 
requires careful consideration of all substantive constitutional standards re-
lating to the legitimacy of governmental purpose.  
3. The Duty of Preservation.—One of the duties sometimes imposed 
upon governments under a public trust framework is to preserve the trust 
corpus for public enjoyment.451  As interpreted by courts, this duty has in-
cluded requirements that officials consider trust concerns prior to disposing 
of or altering the trust resource, engage in pre-disposition comprehensive 
resource planning and cost-benefit analysis, and allow only minimal or nec-
essary harm to trust resources.452  The preservation duty sometimes has also 
included a requirement that the public have access to trust resources regard-
 
447  United States v. City of Jackson, 318 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1963).   
448  Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 699–700 (1992) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); see Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 
1209 n.143 (1996) (“[A] government decision to bulldoze a park—thereby incidentally rendering speech 
in the park impossible—would raise no First Amendment issue.”); David J. Goldstone, The Public Fo-
rum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway (Where Are the Public Forums on the Infor-
mation Superhighway?), 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 401–02 (1995) (noting that officials may close a public 
forum, but arguing against demotion of public forum properties to nonpublic fora); Sullivan, supra note 
4, at 1460 n.193 (noting that the government retains authority to close public forum properties). 
449  See Thomason v. Jernigan, 770 F. Supp. 1195, 1202 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 
450  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring that content-neutral speech 
regulations be supported by an important or substantial interest).  
451  See Lazarus, supra note 426, at 652–53. 
452  See id. (synthesizing precedent). 
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less of who holds title.453  For example, private owners of beachfront prop-
erty may be required to allow public access.454     
In settlement-by-disposition contexts, we might impose upon public of-
ficials a similar duty to preserve forum properties as public spaces open on 
equal terms to the public.  This does not mean that such properties can 
never be sold, altered, closed, or otherwise alienated.  It means simply that 
officials’ discretion to alienate and dispose of public properties and facili-
ties ought to be limited to some degree by preservation concerns.  Some-
times courts can play a role in enforcing this duty.  For the most part, 
however, this is a duty that public officials must internalize and self-
enforce.   
A duty of preservation could be formalized in public disposition laws 
and regulations.  For example, prior to any disposition officials could be re-
quired to consider the effect on overall public use and enjoyment of the sub-
ject property.  They could also be required to carefully—and transparently, 
for example at open public meetings—balance any constitutional objections 
or claims against the purposes served by the disposition.  Finally, although 
it would complicate their efforts to divest themselves of the property and 
thereby avoid constitutional concerns, officials ought to consider recording 
at least limited public access rights and perhaps retaining some interest in 
the subject properties.  Whatever specific form it ultimately takes, the duty 
of preservation would impose some limits on officials’ power to alienate 
constitutional trust resources. 
Although self-imposed limits are likely to be the most effective preser-
vation measures, courts are not powerless to enforce a duty of preservation.  
During the civil rights era, courts were somewhat successful in enforcing a 
preservation obligation, although they did not label it as such.  For example, 
some courts reviewed dispositions involving public school properties with 
heightened skepticism and ultimately refused to allow certain privatiza-
tions.455  Although they did not hold that the government had a constitu-
tional obligation to maintain or operate public schools, courts were not 
blind to the fact that widespread privatization of these properties might fa-
cilitate white flight and indefinite racial segregation.456  Preservation of at 
least some public school properties was deemed critical to granting equal 
access to educational opportunities and to equality more generally.  Simi-
larly, although they did not hold that officials were prohibited from dispos-
ing of public golf courses, cafeterias, or other public properties, courts 
 
453  See Saetz v. Heiser, 240 N.W.2d 67, 72 (N.D. 1976)); Lazarus, supra note 426, at 653 (citing 
Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Mass. 1979)). 
454  See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n,  471 A.2d 355, 365–66 (N.J. 1984) (hold-
ing that private nonprofit association must allow public access to beachfront property).  
455  See supra notes 63–76, 80–103 and accompanying text. 
456  See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973) (noting a dramatic rise in private schools in 
Mississippi following desegregation orders). 
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sometimes sought to preserve the public character of these properties in or-
der to facilitate integration.457  They did this by flexibly interpreting the 
state action doctrine or treating the retention of a future interest by govern-
ment as a sufficient justification for imposing constitutional obligations.  As 
Palmer suggested, however, there are limits to judicial enforcement of any 
preservation obligation.458  Neither the plurality nor the dissent in Buono 
mentioned the negative effect settlement-by-disposition might have on ef-
forts to preserve public resources.  
Imposing the proposed duty of preservation could affect settlement-by-
disposition in the establishment context in several ways.  As noted, prior to 
disposition, officials ought to carefully consider the effect that selling an 
individual parcel located within a public park to a private speaker might 
have on overall public use and enjoyment of the space.  They ought to ac-
knowledge publicly and transparently that establishing exclusive property 
rights will remove the subject parcel from general public use.  Officials 
ought also to consider whether privatization will deter use by those who do 
not share the religious beliefs of the new title holder.  Disposal of substan-
tial parcels may also impact speech and assembly rights in a park or other 
public place.  Taking or otherwise publicizing private property can produce 
similar effects.  Creating special enclaves through dispositions that serve 
primarily private interests is fundamentally inconsistent with the proposed 
duty to preserve public resources and public access.  Granting what are in 
essence preferred positions in public fora to selected speakers is generally 
inconsistent with the proposed obligation to preserve scarce constitutional 
resources.  Officials should be required to carefully consider and publicly 
defend the balance they have struck between disposition and public use.  
Legislators did not do so in Buono, for example, where they enacted the 
transfer statute “without any deliberation whatsoever.”459   
Especially given the variety of other constitutionally valid options 
typically available to them, officials faced with a contest over a public reli-
gious display should consider selling public properties only as a last re-
sort—for example, where removing the religious symbol would actually 
result in its physical destruction.  Similarly, takings and purchases ought 
generally to be reserved for dispositions intended to add to the trust corpus 
and increase public use and access, rather than to rescue private messages 
or take sides in local controversies regarding religious displays.  Assuming 
such transactions are for an otherwise valid purpose and hence satisfy the 
duty of fair dealing, courts will be especially unlikely to invalidate them.  
That, again, is why it is imperative that officials view themselves as trustees 
of the constitutional corpus.  Even if they are not inclined to write preserva-
tion limits into law, officials ought to approach disposition of constitutional 
 
457  See supra notes 78–79, 106–25 and accompanying text. 
458  See supra notes 137–60 and accompanying text. 
459  Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1840 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
104:1361  (2010) Property as/and Constitutional Settlement 
 1427
assets with the same sort of care that often attends disposition of other 
scarce resources.  They ought to balance the need for settlement against the 
harm the disposition might do to the trust resource, the limits it will place 
on public liberties, and the message it will send to the community.       
If after careful consideration of the costs and benefits and the effect on 
public resources officials remain intent on disposition as a means of settling 
establishment disputes, they ought to maximize preservation by privatizing 
the smallest possible parcels.  This follows from the public trust principle 
that officials ought to minimize the harm to trust resources and allow for 
only limited encroachments.460  Here courts can play an important role.  In 
particular, they should not order officials to privatize ever larger parcels of 
public land to demonstrate compliance with the Establishment Clause.461  If 
that is the only way to separate the state from a religious message, then re-
moval of the symbol must be considered the only viable option.  The pub-
lic’s right of access to a public park or other trust resource outweighs any 
interest the government may have in facilitating preservation of the private 
religious speech in question.      
In the speech and assembly context, the principal preservation concern 
is the steady and continuing erosion of the public square.  The public forum 
doctrine provides that existing public streets, parks, and sidewalks are held 
in trust for purposes of expressive activities.  However, the Supreme Court 
has never decided whether public officials have any duty to preserve even 
traditional public forum spaces or whether they may be treated as dispos-
able surplus property.  Imposing a duty of preservation with regard to pub-
lic parks and other forum properties raises a fundamental and unresolved 
First Amendment issue.  As Thomason shows, dispositions that offend the 
neutrality requirement breach the proposed duty of fair dealing and are on 
that basis invalid.462  Is there any basis for imposing a preservation duty 
where governmental decisions to close public forum properties such as 
parks and streets are based upon neutral and presumptively legitimate rea-
sons?  
Suppose, for example, that local officials want to bulldoze a public 
park in order to allow a private contractor to build a housing complex on 
the parcel.463  Assume the reason for the proposed disposition is purely fi-
nancial; officials insist that the park has simply become too costly to main-
tain and that the housing complex is a far more efficient use.  A group of 
citizens objects that this disposition violates their speech and assembly 
 
460  See Lazarus, supra note 426, at 652–53 (noting that some courts have required that public trus-
tees minimize harm to trust assets and interests). 
461  But see Budd, supra note 167, at 244 (“[I]f public property cannot be subdivided in a way that 
effectively separates some portion of the original land from the dominating presence of a religious sym-
bol, government’s only alternative will be to sell the entire parcel if it declines to remove the display.”). 
462  See supra notes 393–405 and accompanying text. 
463  A similar example is mentioned in Dorf, supra note 448, at 1209 n.143.  
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rights, and officials insist that the disposition extinguishes any such claims.  
One might argue that the First Amendment does not apply to such a disposi-
tion.  After all, this is not a situation in which government has regulated 
speech or assembly directly, regulated expression in an existing public fo-
rum, or discriminated against particular speakers or messages.464     
Yet even this incidental burden on speech and assembly may merit 
some First Amendment scrutiny.465  The assumption in the hypothetical is 
that people will be able to assemble and engage in speech elsewhere.466  But 
that assumption may well be false.  The public forum doctrine takes a very 
narrow view of which properties constitute traditional public fora and gives 
officials broad discretion to decide whether to create designated fora for 
speech and assembly.467  Moreover, privatization, audience mobility, public 
policing, and other forces make it even less likely that speech and assembly 
can or will simply be relocated to some other public space.  The destruction 
of an entire public park may thus constitute a rather substantial burden on 
public speech and assembly rights.  This is particularly likely to be the case 
in a locale that does not have ample and adequate alternative venues for 
such activities.  Before a property that traditionally has been available for 
purposes of public speech and assembly is destroyed, First Amendment 
concerns ought to lead public officials to carefully consider the preservation 
implications of such a disposition.468 
Courts likely would play only a very limited role in reviewing such 
dispositions.  A duty of preservation rooted in First Amendment concerns 
does not entail locking officials into public properties and facilities for all 
time.  For example, a local decision to bulldoze a traditional public forum 
on the facts suggested above likely would be upheld under the First 
Amendment.  The government’s objective—to preserve scarce budgetary 
resources and use the parcel in the most efficient manner—likely would be 
deemed important under the circumstances.  The destruction would be con-
tent-neutral, and there would be no claim of unequal or discriminatory ac-
cess in such a case.   
Nevertheless, application of the First Amendment might at least re-
quire that officials explain what post-disposition alternatives for public 
speech and assembly would be available in the community.  In the unlikely 
event that there essentially would be no place for such activities, the pro-
 
464  Cf. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (holding that the First Amendment 
does not apply to the imposition of a general public health regulation to an adult bookstore where no ex-
pressive activity was actually burdened).  
465  See Dorf, supra note 448, at 1209 n.143 (noting that the seeming absence of a First Amendment 
issue in this situation is “more apparent than real”). 
466  See id. 
467  See Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topography, 74 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 439, 448–51 (2006) (describing and critiquing public forum’s categorical approach). 
468  See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
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posed disposition might indeed implicate the First Amendment.469  In such a 
case, it might be appropriate for a court to either idle the bulldozer or at 
least insist that officials consider providing alternative fora.             
Preservation concerns were at least implicit in some of the public fo-
rum disposition cases discussed in Part III.  Some courts noted specifically 
that privatization has diminished opportunities for speech and assembly, es-
pecially in urban areas.470  In the Venetian and LDS cases, the courts ana-
lyzed whether replacement of the public sidewalk and sale of the public 
plaza, respectively, had so transformed the properties that they could no 
longer be deemed public spaces.471  By geographic happenstance, indefinite 
preservation appeared to be the result in the Venetian case.  The replace-
ment sidewalk in front of the casino was actually built into the local pedes-
trian grid.472  Since the parcel continued to function as a public sidewalk 
even after disposition, the court held that the First Amendment continued to 
apply to the subject property.473 
In the LDS case, by contrast, the city was ultimately able to avoid its 
preservation obligations.  Compliance with the duty of preservation would 
have required public maintenance of (at least) the small public easement the 
city had retained after the first sale.  The Tenth Circuit did not impose this 
obligation on the city.474  As in the bulldozed-park hypothetical, the court 
ought to have at least inquired about post-disposition alternatives to the pri-
vatized portion of Main Street.  Again, whether or not the First Amendment 
required this result, city officials ought to have taken it upon themselves to 
preserve the public easement rather than to sell the entire parcel to the LDS 
church.  As a result of the sale of the last piece of what once was a munici-
pal thoroughfare, the public’s right of access was completely extinguished.  
Today, the LDS Church determines, by virtue of the trespass laws, who 
may speak and assemble on Main Street Plaza.475  
 
469  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 35–36 (1993) (sug-
gesting that a shopping center owner’s decision to exclude political protesters “from the only place in 
town where people convene and are available to read and listen” may abridge First Amendment liberties 
of speakers). 
470  See, e.g., First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002). 
471  See id.; Venetian Casino Resort L.L.C. v. Local Joint Executive Bd., 257 F.3d 937, 941, 948 
(9th Cir. 2001). 
472  Venetian Casino, 257 F.3d at 939–40. 
473  See id. at 948. 
474  See Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding 
that the sale of an easement to a private entity extinguished its public forum character). 
475  See supra note 283 and accompanying text.  Perhaps one way to achieve public preservation 
here would be for courts to hold that LDS’s invocation of judicial power to enforce state trespass laws 
implicates state action subject to First Amendment review.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Rich-
ards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1696 (2009) (“Every time 
the civil liability system is used for enforcement, the power of the state is invoked, and state action ex-
ists.”).   
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The proposed duty of preservation, like the duty of fair dealing, does 
not forbid the sale or other disposition of public properties.  It requires, 
however, that officials and courts address preservation concerns when en-
gaging in or reviewing settlement-by-disposition.  This may result in fewer 
or at least more carefully considered dispositions, the privatization of 
smaller parcels, and some consideration by officials regarding whether al-
ternative fora are available for speech and assembly activities after disposi-
tion.  In short, imposing a duty of preservation may prevent at least some 
impairment of constitutional trust resources.    
4. The Duty to Comply with Constitutional Covenants.—Even if a 
disposition satisfies the duties of fair dealing and preservation, it does not 
necessarily settle all constitutional concerns regarding a trust property.  Ow-
ing to the close nexus between the subject properties and constitutional lib-
erties, the public trust may impose certain post-disposition duties on 
government and its successors-in-interest.  Specifically, the alienation must 
not have the effect of violating any constitutional covenants that attach to 
and run with the property.   
In the 1950s and 1960s, circumvention-by-disposition was premised on 
the basic notion that Fourteenth Amendment obligations did not attach to 
the subject properties and run with them through disposition.  Officials 
seem to have believed that the equal protection guarantee could simply be 
leased, devised, or deeded away along with the property.  As we saw, how-
ever, simple leases were deemed insufficient to extinguish Fourteenth 
Amendment obligations even where the government was only minimally 
involved as a lessor.476  Moreover, some courts were willing to apply the 
state action doctrine flexibly in order to impose equal access requirements 
on properties that appeared to have been legally privatized.477  The retention 
of any interest, no matter how minor, was sometimes considered an ade-
quate basis for imposing constitutional duties on purchasers or devisees.478  
Further, if the sale or other conveyance had the post-disposition effect of in-
terfering with school integration, or continuing segregation in public facili-
ties, the courts sometimes rescinded the transaction.479  In a figurative sense, 
then, courts at times were willing to treat the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
covenant that attached to and ran with the subject properties.  Mere transfer 
of title or possession did not extinguish the constitutional covenant of 
equality.  Officials had to either operate the properties or facilities them-
 
476  See supra Part I.C.  
477  See supra notes 107–25 and accompanying text.  Doctrinal stretching of this sort was not un-
common, especially in the school desegregation context.  See KLARMAN, supra note 133, at 342–43 (de-
scribing changes to constitutional doctrine following massive resistance to desegregation). 
478  See Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 1962) (relying upon the exis-
tence of a public reversionary interest to impose an obligation on private owners to provide nondis-
criminatory access to a golf course). 
479  See, e.g., Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447, 453 (5th Cir. 1971).   
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selves or ensure that any private transferee complied with constitutional re-
quirements. 
In contemporary establishment cases, courts have sometimes taken 
steps to impose a duty to comply with constitutional covenants.  In Marsh-
field, for example, the court properly identified the two separate issues that 
must be addressed to determine whether a property disposition settles an 
Establishment Clause claim.480  The first is whether the disposition itself 
constitutes an establishment of religion.481  That question is encompassed 
within the duty of fair dealing and, more specifically, the consideration of 
official purpose.  The second is whether the property disposition has actu-
ally cured the constitutional violation associated with the display.482  This 
inquiry, which relates to the effect of the disposition rather than its purpose, 
requires that courts examine the post-disposition property for compliance 
with the Establishment Clause.  In this sense, the Establishment Clause 
covenant effectively attaches to the property regardless of formal privatiza-
tion. 
In the establishment context, governments have a duty to ensure that 
the disposition has actually settled any endorsement concerns.  This consti-
tutional covenant is based on the premise that governments have not only a 
negative duty under the Establishment Clause to avoid religious preference 
or endorsement, but also an affirmative obligation to ensure that their ac-
tions are not ultimately perceived as favoring religion.483  In establishment 
terms, courts must assess whether a reasonable observer would still per-
ceive, based on the physical characteristics and location of the privatized 
property, that government was favoring or preferring religion.  They must 
also determine whether any restrictions intended to resolve Establishment 
Clause concerns give rise to new free speech concerns.  These post-
disposition inquiries must be made whether the disposition takes the form 
of privatization or publicization.  In this sense, the Establishment Clause 
does not simply disappear upon transfer of title.  Moreover, although a post-
disposition endorsement does not “forever taint” the subject property,484 the 
government has a continuing obligation to demonstrate that physical and 
other alterations to the property have extinguished any official endorsement 
of religion.  In essence, then, there is a continuing duty to comply with the 
establishment covenant.    
 
480  Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2000). 
481  Id. at 493–96. 
482  Id. at 497. 
483  See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Establishment Clause “is more than a 
negative prohibition against certain narrowly defined forms of government favoritism; it also imposes 
affirmative obligations that may require a State, in some situations, to take steps to avoid being per-
ceived as supporting or endorsing a private religious message” (citation omitted)).  
484  McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 874 (2004). 
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Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Buono might be read as casting 
some doubt on the very notion of constitutional covenants.  As noted ear-
lier, Justice Kennedy questioned whether the reasonable observer test even 
applied to privatized properties like the “donut hole” in the Mojave.485  This 
merely demonstrates why compliance with a duty of fair dealing is neces-
sary but not sufficient.  Even if the purpose of the transfer statute was le-
gitimate and secular, the effect of the transfer may still be a continuing 
governmental endorsement of religion.  The anti-establishment covenant 
operates as an additional check on settlement-by-disposition.  As Justice 
Stevens noted in his Buono dissent, where the issue presented is whether the 
disposition cures an existing Establishment Clause violation, it is particu-
larly appropriate to inquire whether the disposition itself removes the per-
ception of official endorsement of religion.486       
In the speech and assembly context, some courts have imposed obliga-
tions on the government and its successors to comply with free speech and 
assembly covenants.  Thus even after title passes to private owners, insofar 
as the property conveys subject to rights of public access or continues to 
function as a public forum its owners or possessors must continue to com-
ply with constitutional commands.  In the Venetian and LDS cases, the 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits imposed this duty by applying a functional post-
disposition standard.  As the court said in the LDS case, which initially in-
volved retention of a public easement across a privatized plaza, “a deed 
does not insulate government action from constitutional review.”487  An 
easement or other parcel that functions as a public forum should be treated 
as one, these courts properly held, regardless of the attempted privatization.  
Thus, like the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech and Free Assembly 
Clauses attach to public forum properties and follow them through disposi-
tion.  As the LDS case showed, the speech and assembly covenants do not 
apply in perpetuity.  Rather, they attach to the subject properties until their 
uses and physical characteristics indicate they are no longer functioning as 
public fora.488     
The duty to comply with constitutional covenants has been unevenly 
and indeed somewhat weakly enforced.  As noted in Parts I and II, not all 
courts have adopted and applied the functional approach.  Some have fo-
 
485  Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1819 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
486  See id. at 1837–38 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
487  First Unitarian Church v. Salt Lake City, Corp., 308 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002).  
488  The functional approach is rooted in Justice Kennedy’s concern that the rigid categorical ap-
proach of the public forum doctrine left too little space for public speech and assembly.  See Int’l Soc’y 
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In my 
view, our public forum doctrine must recognize this reality, and allow the creation of public forums that 
do not fit within the narrow tradition of streets, sidewalks, and parks.”).  He proposed a more functional 
standard.  See id. (“If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the actual public 
access and uses that have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity would be 
appropriate and compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum.”).  
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cused narrowly on the disposition instrument and refused to impose any 
post-disposition obligations at all.  Moreover, as noted, the plurality opinion 
in Buono casts some doubt on the post-disposition application of the en-
dorsement test.489  Recent cases have also backtracked from the civil rights 
era principle that mere retention of a reversionary interest may be sufficient 
to activate a constitutional covenant.490  Even courts that apply a functional 
approach in disposition cases sometimes impose only minimal, largely su-
perficial requirements—posting small signs or erecting fences—to satisfy 
continuing covenants.491  Thus, minor aesthetic alterations may be sufficient 
to extinguish First Amendment obligations.  For example, Main Street 
Plaza in Salt Lake City is still quite capable of functioning as a public fo-
rum.  However, because the courts accepted the argument that landscape al-
terations and signage indicating that the space is now “private” property 
extinguished First Amendment covenants, the church may now exclude 
public speakers.492  As applied, the functional standard often seems to allow 
governments both to enjoy the financial benefits of property dispositions 
and to avoid their constitutional obligations to allow public speech and as-
sembly.    
Imposition of post-disposition constitutional obligations would ac-
knowledge that the passage of title or possession does not insulate a dispo-
sition from constitutional scrutiny.  To some extent, then, First Amendment 
and other constitutional covenants ought to be deemed to run with the sub-
ject property.  The challenge for courts is to ensure that these covenants are 
meaningfully enforced such that officials cannot simply walk away once the 
deed is done.  The challenge for officials is to resist the temptation to reap 
the benefits of disposition while shirking their constitutional duties.  
5. Remedial Issues.—Whether judicially enforced or voluntarily un-
dertaken, the foregoing public trust duties would constrain officials’ ability 
to alienate critical and scarce constitutional assets.  In the event of a breach, 
we must consider what remedies are available.  There are three principal 
remedies for breach of the public trust duties with regard to settlement-by-
disposition.  The first and most obvious is political.  Voters who disagree 
with the disposition choices of their representatives may vote them out of 
office or lobby for a change in policy.  This political remedy is not likely to 
be effective in disposition cases where title has already changed hands.493  
 
489  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1819 (plurality opinion). 
490  See, e.g., Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that the retention of a reversionary interest by the city did not impose constitutional duties 
on the private purchaser or create a public forum). 
491  See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 483, 497 (7th Cir. 
2000) (recommending the erection of a fence or wall to remedy any continuing endorsement of religion). 
492  See Utah Gospel Mission, 425 F.3d at 1255–56 (concluding that the city had settled free speech 
claims in part by making adequate alterations to the plaza). 
493  It is of course theoretically possible that newly elected officials may attempt to use the taking 
power to reclaim previously sold or devised assets.     
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Nor is it likely to result in resale of properties taken to settle constitutional 
claims.  A strong political reaction might lead, however, to a general change 
in policy regarding fair dealing, public property preservation, and compli-
ance with constitutional covenants. 
The two other principal remedies—rescission of the disposition and 
application of constitutional standards to post-disposition properties—are 
judicial in nature.  Here, again, there are some lessons from the civil rights 
era.  As noted earlier, where a disposition was effectuated with knowledge 
that it would lead to segregation, courts were more likely to order rescis-
sion.  In other circumstances, though, courts were reluctant to rescind the 
sale, even though it had not completely dissolved the equal protection claim 
or controversy.  For example, in McNeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that 
the appropriate remedy in a case involving the good faith sale of a public 
school property to a private segregated academy was not rescission of the 
sale but a requirement that the private academy admit students without re-
gard to race.494 
Where a court determines that the duty of fair dealing has been 
breached, an injunction rescinding the sale is the most appropriate remedy.  
Were the result otherwise, the establishment prohibition and free speech 
and assembly guarantees effectively could be nullified by the mere disposi-
tion of public property.  The private purchaser cannot be heard to complain, 
with regard to either her property or speech rights.  The sale has been re-
scinded on constitutional grounds, thus rendering it a nullity.  Similarly, in 
the takings context, should a court determine that a property has been taken 
for an invalid discriminatory purpose, the taking must be invalidated.  Fi-
nally, in the rare case in which a disposition destroys the only public forum 
available in a community, the disposition may either be rescinded or altered 
to provide for alternative public forum space.   
However, where a court has determined that the disposition of public 
property is not a sham and does not violate the duty of preservation, rescis-
sion is not an appropriate remedy.  Courts must take into account the sig-
nificant property and speech rights of the private owner, who has now taken 
possession pursuant to a bona fide transaction.  They must also consider the 
detrimental effects that would follow from rescission, including harms as-
sociated with possible destruction of religious symbols and the expectation 
interests of the parties.495  As in McNeal, the only appropriate remedy in 
such cases is to enforce against the private owner the duty to comply with 
applicable constitutional covenants.  In First Amendment contexts, the pri-
vate owner must alter the property such that a reasonable observer will not 
perceive endorsement or the property will no longer be capable of function-
ing as a public forum. 
 
494  McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 460 F.2d 568, 574 (5th Cir. 1972). 
495  See Budd, supra note 167, at 228–31 (discussing problems associated with the removal of reli-
gious symbols, including possible destruction and loss of communicative impact). 
104:1361  (2010) Property as/and Constitutional Settlement 
 1435
C. Constitutional Settlements 
Ultimately, the point of imposing public trust duties on public officials 
is to ensure that they enter constitutional settlements.  As the discussion in-
dicates, the proposed duties are based upon and subsume various constitu-
tional obligations.  In general, constitutional settlements must serve a public 
trust purpose, comply with both the letter and spirit of judicial orders and 
decrees relating to the subject properties, and respect minority rights.  These 
limits obviously go beyond the basic procedural and democratic require-
ments for ordinary property dispositions.  As I hope to have explained in 
this Article, the dispositions at issue are in no sense ordinary.   
A constitutional settlement must be distinguished from a purely majori-
tarian solution or a political settlement that is based upon special constitu-
ents’ interests or discriminatory community attitudes.  For example, one 
proposal for settling constitutional contests relating to public properties is to 
put the decision whether to sell the subject property to a public referen-
dum.496  Imagine that such a referendum had been placed before a small 
Southern community in the 1960s after a judge had entered a desegregation 
order, the question on the ballot being whether to sell the local public 
school to a private entity that happens to be segregated.  Similarly, in a 
community committed to public expressions of faith, imagine putting a pro-
posed disposition of public park property upon which a cross rests to a ref-
erendum after a court has ordered that the display violates the 
Establishment Clause and must be removed.  Finally, suppose the question 
posed in the LDS Main Street case—whether a public easement for speech 
and assembly ought to be retained by the city—had been put to a direct vote 
of the people.  The process in these situations would certainly be democ-
ratic.  The problem, however, is that the process ignores public trust consid-
erations and is sometimes based upon strategies for overturning judicial 
determinations regarding constitutional requirements, thereby providing lit-
tle or no protection for the constitutional rights of minorities.   
During the civil rights era, some lower courts rightly seemed skeptical 
that property dispositions that occurred close in time to the entry of a deseg-
regation order and involved public school properties could constitute le-
gitimate constitutional settlements.  Outside the schools context, however, 
the Supreme Court and other courts seemed to have a more ambivalent 
view.  They tolerated dispositions that were almost certainly based upon 
constituents’ racial attitudes and their general objection to integration, and 
that seemed designed to thwart judicial desegregation decrees that commu-
nities found unacceptable.497  A democratic settlement can give voice and 
 
496  See John C. Crees, Note, The Right and Wrong Ways to Sell a Public Forum, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
1419, 1444–46 (2009) (proposing a pre-disposition referendum procedure). 
497  See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 255 (1971) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
city officials had determined to dispose of the public swimming pools because compliance with a deseg-
regation order “would be intolerable to Jackson’s citizens”).  
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effect to such public attitudes, but a constitutional settlement cannot.  Prop-
erty dispositions ought to be based on a thorough consideration of constitu-
tional interests rather than on political pressure or legislative expediency.  
Contemporary courts have also upheld or otherwise signaled approval 
for what seem in some cases to be purely democratic or political, as op-
posed to constitutional, settlements.  In Buono, for example, the plurality 
urged deference to a land transfer measure buried in an appropriations bill 
and apparently “undertaken without any deliberation whatsoever.”498  The 
plurality did not explain why deference to Congress’s political determina-
tion, as opposed to its considered constitutional judgment, was appropriate.   
Particularly in the religious symbols context but in others as well, there 
seems to be a type of fight-to-the-death mentality.  Displays are blocked by 
judicial decrees, which in turn are countered by property dispositions, 
which in turn are reviewed for constitutionality.  As Buono shows, multiple 
enactments may be required to preserve a single religious symbol499—one 
the legislature assures us has only secular import.500  When all else has 
failed, the broad powers of Congress have been relied upon to settle matters 
by selling or taking properties.   
There is something dubious, perhaps even unseemly, about this proc-
ess.  Officials obviously are entitled to defend allocations and dispositions 
of contested public properties.  They can, for example, insist that a religious 
symbol be displayed on public land and may defend that display in court as 
being constitutional.  Once they have lost that battle, however, one may le-
gitimately question whether officials ought to stubbornly persist by turning 
to private-law-based transactions.     
A constitutional settlement ought to convey the impression and con-
vince the political community that officials have taken constitutional obli-
gations seriously.  Is that the impression conveyed by the creation of 
veritable donut holes in public parks, the taking by the federal government 
of properties at the center of local constitutional contests, or the conveyance 
in fee simple of portions of Main Street?  The constitutional lessons for 
both the losers of these contests and the public at large may be: (1) that their 
public liberties are largely if not wholly discretionary in the sense that they 
can be terminated by disposition, and (2) that public officials are empow-
ered to sell or otherwise dispose of the corpus of the public trust to advance 
the private interests of certain speakers or faiths.   
Officials sometimes have claimed that selling or taking public property 
quells constitutional controversy.  For example, when Congress took the 
Mt. Soledad property on which a Latin cross is presently located, it claimed 
 
498  Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1840 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
499  Id. at 1813 (plurality opinion). 
500  Id. at 1816–17 (claiming that the cross, “[a]lthough certainly a Christian symbol,” was not 
placed on public land to convey a Christian message). 
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to do so in part to settle an intractable local controversy.501  Similarly, when 
Salt Lake City officials sold the remaining easement on what used to be a 
portion of Main Street, they claimed to do so in part to “reduce the public 
outcry” that followed its joint ownership of the parcel with the LDS 
Church.502  In Buono, the plurality characterized Congress’s decision to en-
act the land transfer statute as intended to avoid offending those who be-
lieve the Latin cross represents a legitimate aspect of the country’s religious 
heritage.503  This controversy-avoidance justification has gained legitimacy 
in Establishment Clause cases, particularly as a result of Justice Breyer’s 
concurring opinion in Van Orden v. Perry.504  Van Orden upheld the display 
of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol.505  
One of Justice Breyer’s justifications for upholding the display was a con-
cern that a contrary ruling “might well encourage disputes concerning the 
removal of longstanding depictions of the Ten Commandments from public 
buildings across the Nation[, and] . . . thereby create the very kind of relig-
iously based divisiveness that the Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.”506 
Quelling controversy is not an illegitimate goal, of course.  For exam-
ple, as noted earlier, serious concerns may arise from injunctive relief that 
essentially requires the destruction of a religious symbol.507  However, set-
tlement-by-disposition cannot generally be justified on the ground that it 
quells controversy or reduces divisiveness.  For example, the maintenance 
of a religious symbol may reduce offense to some believers.  However, “it 
does not follow that the government can decline to cure an Establishment 
Clause violation in order to avoid offense.”508  Moreover, some property 
dispositions may actually encourage controversy.  For example, privatiza-
tion of properties on which religious symbols are located may violate the 
free speech rights of private speakers.  Other speakers may bring access 
claims of their own, insisting that officials privatize additional public prop-
erties to sanction their religious or other messages.  Similarly, publicization 
of private religious symbols may settle free speech claims while at the same 
time giving rise to establishment concerns.  It is not entirely clear that dis-
 
501  See Trunk v. City of San Diego, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1199, 1209–11 (S.D. Cal. 2008) (citing con-
gressional findings indicating that the taking was motivated by lengthy litigation and unsuccessful ef-
forts by local officials to settle the controversy).  
502  Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 2005). 
503  See Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1817 (plurality opinion) (noting Congress’s desire not to convey disre-
spect “for those the cross was seen as honoring”); id. at 1823 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment) (noting that “removal would have been viewed by many as a sign of disrespect for 
the brave soldiers whom the cross was meant to honor” and “as an arresting symbol of a Government 
that is not neutral but hostile on matters of religion and is bent on eliminating from all public places and 
symbols any trace of our country’s religious heritage”). 
504  545 U.S. 677 (2005).  
505  Id. at 681. 
506  Id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
507  See Budd, supra note 167, at 228–31. 
508  Buono, 130 S. Ct. at 1839 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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positions settle even the underlying political controversy.  Indeed, rather 
than settle controversies, dispositions of properties that are at the center of 
constitutional contests may breed public resentment and cynicism.  This is 
particularly true where purported settlements appear nakedly strategic or 
political rather than deliberative and constitutional.        
In sum, officials may in some cases be reaching democratic or political 
settlements through the vehicle of property disposition.  But several decades 
of experience with settlement-by-disposition have shown that democratic 
processes sometimes must be supplemented with measures designed to pre-
serve public use and enjoyment of trust properties on equal terms.  Ulti-
mately, officials ought to seek and courts ought to enforce settlements that 
are based upon public trust purposes, comply with judicial decrees, and re-
spect minority constitutional rights.  Some of these settlements likely will 
be less politically popular; but they will be more constitutionally legitimate.  
That should be the public trustee’s principal concern. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been clear since the civil rights era that government may not 
simply turn the Constitution off at will by disposing of public properties.  
As we have seen, however, the constraints on settlement-by-disposition are 
rather thin and ad hoc.  In general, public officials have not acted as com-
mitted trustees of the subject properties.  Instead, they have disposed of 
properties as if government is an ordinary owner or purchaser, and as if the 
subject properties are ordinary assets akin to surplus properties.509  Neither 
of these things is true.  Indeed, one of the critical lessons of the civil rights 
era is that governmental dispositions often have significant constitutional 
implications.  Public officials, and in many cases courts, have failed to in-
ternalize this critical lesson.      
It at least ought to be clear that formalistic treatment of governmental 
property dispositions will not adequately protect constitutional rights.  The 
satisfaction of private law requirements relating to title transfer does not re-
solve whether officials have met their public constitutional obligations.  
Governmental takings and purchases ought likewise to be subject to more 
rigorous constitutional scrutiny.  These dispositions are hardly free of the 
risk of circumvention-by-disposition.   
As some courts demonstrated during the civil rights era, the judiciary 
does not lack the power or means to thwart circumvention-by-disposition.  
The adoption by some courts of functional approaches in First Amendment 
contexts attests to at least some judicial uneasiness with settlement-by-
disposition.  Unfortunately, however, bits and pieces of our public square 
continue to be auctioned off, conveyed, and taken as the supposed price of 
 
509  The state-as-ordinary-owner mentality is rooted in public forum doctrine.  See Adderley v. Flor-
ida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (“The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve 
the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”).  
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settling constitutional claims and concerns.  The purported settlements af-
fect not only individual complainants’ rights of use and enjoyment but also 
the public’s right to enjoy access on an equal basis to a constitutional com-
mons.     
We need to rethink the nature and effect of settlement-by-disposition.  
This Article has proposed a different mindset or framework with regard to 
governmental disposition of properties.  I have argued that public officials 
and courts ought to be guided by a public trust model.  Under this approach, 
the decision to dispose of certain trust properties triggers duties of fair deal-
ing, preservation, and compliance with constitutional covenants.  Ulti-
mately, settlements must be constitutional in the sense that they foster a 
valid trust purpose, comply with judicial orders and injunctions, and respect 
minority and dissenting rights.   
I recognize that this framework runs counter to the trend toward expan-
sion of governmental control over public properties.  In the 1960s, Harry 
Kalven Jr. celebrated the public’s ability to “commandeer” public fora for 
purposes of protest and assembly.510  Today, however, it is government that 
controls such places through the public forum doctrine, an array of time, 
place, and manner restrictions, and now property dispositions.  I also recog-
nize the limitations of a public trust model, including the difficulties associ-
ated with judicial enforcement of trust duties and the real-world political 
pressures that often push officials in the direction of settlement-by-
disposition.  Without minimizing these limitations, however, the public 
trust model at least refocuses the discussion of settlement-by-disposition 
from purely private law concerns to a more appropriate set of public consti-
tutional obligations.  The private property paradigm has produced a vastly 
diminished constitutional commons.  If that trend is to continue, we ought 
at least to have an honest debate regarding what is actually being allocated 








510  Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
11–12. 
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